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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Shipowners, by the yery nature of their business
undertakings of transporting passengers and goods by water,
find themselves exposed to a variety of risks which are to a
large extent unique to the maritime adventure. In addition,
certain other factors have increased shipowners' exposure to
loss : an increase in the size and value of ships; an
increase in marine traffic; the enactment of legislation
imposing new liabilities; and finally, the tendency of
courts to make huge awards in respect of personal injury and
death claims.
The shipowner, therefore, as ultimate responsible person
for the undertaking, finds himself exposed to potential
losses or claims amounting to millions of dollars in the
event of disaster; indeed a burden that can be carried by
few if any shipowners.
This unfavorable situation of shipowners created a
desperate need for protection, which firstly led to the
establishment of the marine insurance industry - today the
\/ery core of shipowner protection; and secondly, prompted
the enactment of legislation that would limit shipowners'
1
liability - a device designed not only to preserve the
shipping industry for its valuable role in international
commerce and trade, but to encourage investment in and
expansion of a strong merchant marine.
These two principal devices for shipowners' protection
form the subject of this study. Although both have an
international application, the emphasis will be en United
States law and practice with due recognition cf the British
marine insurance law and practice, and the International
Conventions on limitation of liability.
A substantial portion of the study is devoted to an
overview of the general principles underlying these
comprehensive subjects so that the reader can form an
overall understanding of the field of law within which the
main issues present themselves.
The issues under discussion are the justification, if
any, for the continued existence of legislation limiting
shipowner's liability; the confusion created (amongst
shipowners, insurers and third party claimants) by the
inconsistent reasoning of the courts in their endeavors to
ensure adequate compensation for personal injury and death
claimants who are often the victims of the limitation
system; and the role that marine liability insurance plays
in the protection of both shipowner and third party
claimant.
CHAPTER II
LIMITATION OF SHIPOWNERS' LIABILITY
A. INTRODUCTION
The principle whereby a shipowner may limit his
liability to the value of his ship and its pending freight
has been part of United States law since the enactment of
the Limitation of Liability Act in 1851, and in spite of
increased criticism it is still being kept intact.
The issue presented by this method of shipowner
protection is one of conflict between, on the one hand, the
desirability of protecting those who invest in shipping from
inordinate loss (by fostering adequate and reasonably priced
insurance), and, on the other hand, the necessity of
fairness to claimants by affording a remedy for cargo losses
and personal injuries. However, the question is often
raised whether any justification remains for maintaining the
limitation principle in this modern age where technological
advances have almost eliminated the owner's risk of loss,
where the ownership in ships vests more and more in
corporations, and where insurance is available for most
maritime risks.
3
The current view of this controversial issue is
expressed by Justice Black in Maryland Casualty Co. v .
1
Cush i ng : "Many of the conditions in the shipping
industry which induced the 1851 Congress to pass the Act no
longer prevail. ...If shipowners really need an additional
subsidy, Congress can give it to them without making injured
seamen bear the cost."
The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of
the origin, development and current operation of the United
States limitation policy. Although the United States has to
date been reluctant to be party to international conventions
by which global maritime nations have attempted to modify
the limitation concept to conform with modern needs, a draft
bill based on the 1976 Convention has nevertheless been
submitted to Congress for enactment. It will also be
demonstrated how this Convention modifies the current
Limitation Act.
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Hugo Grotius in 1625 wrote : "Men would be deterred
from employing ships, if they lay under the perpetual fear
of being answerable for the acts of their masters to an
2
unlimited extent." In referring to Dutch law, he went on
to say that "it is an established rule that no action can be
maintained against the owner for any greater sum than the
3
value of the ship and cargo."
It is not certain where and when the concept of limited
4
liability originates from, but Judge Ware's observations
5
in The Rebecca offers a good overview : "It originated
in the maritime usages of the Middle Ages, and more
particularly the Mediterranean ..." where the Consulate
of the Sea, which governed the maritime commerce of all
Mediterranean ports, provided that "... the owners shall not
be liable except for the amount of their shares in the
6
ship."
He went on to say that "... I think it may safely be
affirmed that, by the general maritime law of Europe, the
liability of owners for the wrongful acts of the master is
limited to the interest they have in the ship, and that by
abandoning the ship and freight to the creditor tfiey
7
discharge themselves from all personal responsibility."
The privilege of the limitation of shipowners' liability
spread to most continental jurisdictions so that by the end
of the seventeenth century the principle became firmly
8
established among the leading maritime nations of Europe.
In England, the doctrine of respondeat superior a p p 1 i e d
until 1734 when the Responsibility of Shipowners Act was
passed whereby limitation was provided to British
9
shipowners. It differed from its continental counterpart
in that liability was limited to the value of the vessel as
determined prior to the accident, and not as determined
10 11
afterwards. In 1854 the Merchant Shipping Act was
passed to include cases involving loss of life and personal
injury, and a limitation fund was established whereby a
fixed sum per tonnage was shared by claimants. This system
12
formed the basis for the 1957 Brussels Convention.
In the United States, the earliest legislation on this
subject is found in a Massachusetts statute of 1819 (which
was modelled on the 1734 English statute), followed by a
13
1821 statute of Maine, but American shipowners were not
alerted to their vulnerability until the Supreme Court in
1848 held the owner of a destroyed vessel. The Lexington
,
14
fully liable for cargo damage.
In this case the steamboat Lexington, en route from New
York to Stonington, Connecticut, was totally destroyed when
a fire broke out in a cargo of cotton and then spread to
the vessel itself. Apart from the loss of many lives, the
vessel and its cargo, also lost was a wooden crate, the
contents of which were not declared by the shipper but later
proved to have contained $18 000 worth in gold and silver
coin. The owners of the Lexington were held liable for the
full amount, in spite of a stipulation in the bill of lading
which limited the carrier's liability to the declared value
of goods carried.
In consequence of the uneasiness produced among
shipowners by this decision, and for the purpose of putting
American shipping upon an equality with that of other
maritime nations. Congress enacted the Limitation of
15
Liabi 1 ity Act in 1851.
C. THE LIMITATION OF LIABILITY ACT, 1851
1. Purpose
Sympathy for shipowners and an awareness of the
importance of placing American merchant shipping upon an
eaual footing with other maritime nations easily persuaded
16
Congress to enact the Limitation Act of 1851.
The judicial remarks in subsequent cases best describe
the purpose of the Act as follows: "...to promote the
building of ships, and to encourage persons engaged in the
business of navigation and to place that of this country
upon a footing with England and on the continent of
17 18
Europe"; "to encourage investments in ships".
2. Development
The Limitation Act has since its enactment in 1851 been
amended several times, and due to its apparent vagueness and
its failure to provide intelligible guidelines for
19
administration, the limitation policy as a whole was
20
frequently modified by judicial lawmaking of the courts.
In 1871 a minor amendment was passed whereby the list of
goods, the nature and value of which need to be declared in
21
the bill of lading, was extended. In the same year the
benefits of the Limitation Act were invoked for the first
time in the landmark case of Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co. v.
22
Wright where the Supreme Court laid down the following
principles : first, that the Federal District Court,
8sitting as a court of admiralty, has jurisdiction of cases
23
arising under the Act; second, that the court must have
possession of the limitation fund (the proceeds or sum equal
24
to the value of the ship and pending freight); third,
that the value of the owner's interest must be determined
25
after the disaster.
Following its holding in the Wright -case, the Supreme
Court in 1872 supplemented the Act by issuing the General
Admiralty Rules which prescribed the practice and procedure
26
in limitation proceedings.
These developments were followed by minor additions and
27
rephrasing in 1874, 1877 and 1880 until the Supreme
28
Court in 1881 in another landmark case. The Scotland
confirmed that the value of an owner's interest is to be
determined at the end of the voyage or after the
29
disaster, and also that fore i an shipowners had access to
30
the benefits of the American Limitation Act.
In 1884 the Act was amended by the addition cf a
31
clause which extended the owner's right to limit all
32
claims, including tort claims and most contractual
claims, but excluding seamen's wages and claims arisina from
3 3
"personal contracts".
34
In 1886 in The City of Norwich the Supreme Court
held that the proceeds of hull insurance do not form part
of the owners' interest in the vessel and need not be
35
surrendered. Another significant development in 1886
was the amendment of the Act to extend limitation beyond the
traditional concept of ocean faring vessels to "all seagoing
vessels, and also to all vessels used on lakes or rivers or
in inland navigation, including canal boats, barges and
36
1 i ghters . "
An initial liberal construction of the Limitation Act
in favor of shipowners, in pursuance of the Congressional
intent, became the focus of serious concern when a series of
37
maritime disasters in the mid-1930's, the most famous of
38
which was the burning of the Morrow Castle culminating
in the loss of 135 lives, demonstrated the inadequacies and
injustices of the United States limitation policy.
These developments led Congress to enact the so-called
39 40
"loss of life" amendments in 1935 and 1936 whereby
the shipowner was required to establish a minimum limitation
41
fund of $60 per ton of a sea-going vessel's gross or
registered tonnage to be available for personal injury and
42
death claims only. This fund was required in addition to
the normal surrendering of the owner's interest in the ship
and pending freight.
After a merger of the civil and admiralty rules of
procedure in 1966, the rules were replaced by Supplemental
43
Admiralty Rule F of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
which currently prescribes the limitation procedure.
In view of the above developments it can generally be
said that the construction of the Limitation Act and its
provisions have over the years changed from a liberal
10
approach favoring shipowners to an increasingly restrictive
approach to protect the interests of claimants.
3. Current Structure of the Act
The United States limitation law is currently regulated
by the Limitation of Liability Act, 1851 as amended and
currently enacted under Title 46 of the United States Code
sections 181-189, together with Supplemental Rule F of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Those sections that are
relevant to this study are summarized as follows :
Section 181 frees the owner and master from liability
for valuables unless written notice of their character and
value is given by the shipper and such information is
entered on the bill of lading. If these requirements are
met, however, the master or owner can be held liable but
their liability will be limited to the value and according
44
to the character of such goods so notified and entered.
Section 182, also known as the "Fire Statute",
exonerates the owner from all liability for cargo lost or
45
damaged by fire unless caused by the "design or neglect"
of the owner. The practical importance of this section has
to a large extent been substituted for the Carriage of Goods
46
by Sea Act.
Section 183(a) is often referred to as the heart of the
Act since it contains the general provisions which limit the
liability of the owner to the value of his interest in the
vessel and her pending freight, except for personal or
11
property damage incurred with the privity or knowledge o^
the owner. Subsections (b)-(f), which were added by the
1935 and 1936 amendments to deal with limitation against
claims for death and personal injury, firstly provide for
the establishment of a fund to be available onlv for such
47
claims; it also provides that liability will be imposed
separately for "distinct occasions", presumably meaning that
if two or more catastrophes occur on the same voyage, the
48
owner will be liable up to $420 per ton per occasion; it
also tightened the "privity or knowledge" provision so that
the master, superintendent and managing agent's privity or
49
knowledge is deemed to be that of the owner; finally, it
contains a list of vessels that are excluded from these
50
provisions. All these aspects will be discussed in more
51
detail below.
Section 183b contains stipulations granting at least
six months for giving notice of loss of life or bodily
injury claims by passengers, or at least one year for
commencing suit on such claims. Section 183c provides that
it shall be unlawful for the manager, agent, master or owner
of any vessel transporting passengers between a U.S. port
and foreign ports to contract out of liability for
negligence, or to liquidate damages in any stated amount, or
to avoid the right of any claimant to a trial by a court of
competent jurisdiction.
12
Section 184 provides for the apportionment of
compensation among the claimants in proportion to their
respective losses when the value of the vessel and her
freight is not sufficient to compensate each of them fully.
Section 185 provides that the vessel owner may, within
six months after a claim has been filed against him,
petition the court for limitation of liability by depositing
with the court a sum equal to the value of his interest or
approved security therefor, or at his option transfer his
interest (the vessel) to a court-appointed trustee for the
benefit of claimants. Upon compliance with these
requirements all claims and proceedings against the owner
shall cea se .
Section 186 provides that a charterer who mans, victuals
and navigates a vessel at his own expense or by his own
procurement, shall be deemed the owner of such vessel for
52
purposes of limiting liability.
Finally, section 188 extends the applicability of the
Act to all seagoing vessels, including those used on lakes,
53
rivers or inland navigation.
Suppl emen ta 1 Rule F
Rule F(l) prescribes the procedures that an owner must
follow after a claim has been brought against him : he must
file his complaint within 6 months in the appropriate
district court; deposit with the court a sum equal to his
interest in the vessel and pending freight, or security
13
therefor; or transfer to a court-appointed trustee his
interest in the vessel and pending freight; give security
for costs .
Rule F(2) contains the requirements for the complaint
and lists all the facts and information that should be
reflected therein.
Rule F(3) provides for the injunction of all claims and
proceedings against the owner or his property once the owner
has complied with the requirements of subrule (1).
Rule F(4) deals with notice to claimants given by the
court and matters related thereto, whereas subrule (5)
contains the requirements for the time within and format in
which the claimants' claims and answers should be filed.
Rule F(6) requires from the owner to give certain
information to each claimant or his attorney.
Rule F(7) provides that the court may, upon motion by a
claimant alleging that the fund or security deposited by the
owner is insufficient, re-appraise the value of the owner's
interest and order that the deposit or security be increased
or reduced whatever the case may be.
Rule F(8) provides for the objection by interested
parties to any claim, and also for the distribution of the
fund pro rata among claimants in proportion to their
respective claims.
Finally, Rule F(9) deals with the venue of limitation
proceedings, and provides for the transfer of actions to
other districts.
14
4. Scope of the Act
The question as to which liabilities are subject to
limitation under the Act will be answered by merely listing
those liabilities that are, and those that are not, subject
to limitation.
54
( i ) Liabilities subject to limitation.
A shipowner may limit his liability against claims for:
damage to property, goods or merchandise carried on board
his vessel; collision damages; loss of a vessel in tow or
its cargo; losses by acts of war; salvage; fire on board;
personal injury and death; damage to fixed structures on
land.
A shipowner may also limit against liabilities imposed
55
by other statutes such as the Death on the High Seas
Act; the Merchant Marine Act (Jones Act); Employers'
Liability Act; State Workmen's Compensation Acts; State
canal and harbor laws; safety laws and environmental laws.
56
( i i ) Liabilities not subject to limitation
These include unearned prepaid freight; losses incurred
while deviating from a contract voyage; losses due to
personal acts or default of the shipowner; awards for
maintenance and cure of seamen.
15
Also excluded from limitation are liabilities imposed by
57
other statutes such as: Foreign Wrongful Death Statutes;
Criminal Statutes; Seamen's Wages Act; and losses due to
statutory fault, or violation of statutory commands.
There are also circumstances under which a shipowner may
not petition for limitation in respect of his "personal
58
contracts"
.
D. WHO MAY LIMIT - WHEN ?
Genera 1
The Limitation Act grants the right to limit liability
to the owner of any seagoing vessel for losses or damage
59
incurred without the privity or knowledge of such owner,
and further provides that charterers may under certain
60
circumstances be deemed the owner. However, the Act
does not define the word "owner", thus subjecting it to
judicial construction.
62
1. Owner
Generally speaking, an owner is one by whom or for
61
whom legal title to the vessel is held, and may be an
individual, shareholders in a corporation, a partnership
63
or even the government.
Since the Liability Act does not define "owner", the
courts have always construed the word broadly in order to
effectuate the purpose of the Act, namely "to encourage
16
investment by exempting the investor from loss in excess of
64
the fund he is willing to risk in the enterprise."
65
In F 1 i n k v . P a 1 a d i n
i
the vessel "Henrietta" was
owned by a corporation, the stockholders of which were sued
individually by Flink for a sum in excess of the value of
the vessel for injuries which he sustained while employed on
the vessel. The stockholders sought limitation to which
Flink objected by contending that stockholders are not
"owners" within the meaning of the Limitation Act. The
court held that the stockholders may limit their liability
66
as "part owners" and emphasized that the words of the
Act should be construed in a broad and popular sense in
67
order not to defeat the manifest intent.
2. Charterer
Section 186 of the Limitation Act provides that the
charterer of any vessel who shall man, victual and navigate
such vessel at his own expense or procurement shall be
deemed an owner.
68
Bareboat charterers may petition for limitation.
69
However, voyage or time charterers do not qualify, this
in spite of the fact that long term time charterers may have
the most significant economic interest in the construction
70
and operation of vessels.
Insurers have generally been denied the right to limit
even though they may be subject to suit under state direct
71
action statutes.
17
3. Privity or Knowledge
Section 183 of the Limitation Act provides that
limitation of liability will be granted to shipowners for
losses occasioned or incurred without. their privity or
knowledge. This qualification gives the shipowner a measure
of protection against claims arising from operational errors
72
which fall beyond his control.
However, the privity or knowledge standard has caused
73
much confusion by reason of its inherent vagueness. The
confusion is created by questions such as : what is
considered to be within the owner's privity or knowledge?
who determines it and by what standards? to what extent is
the conduct of employees considered within the owner's
(employer) privity or knowledge? what is the position with
respect to corporations as owners?
Judicial interpretations of this standard have changed
over the years : initially the courts construed this
provision yery much in favor of the shipowner in pursuit of
the Congressional intent, but the recent trend is that
claimants successfully use this yery provision to restrict
74
the relief offered by the Act, A procedural matter
favoring claimants in this regard is the fact that the
burden of proof is upon the petitioning shipowner to prove
the negative proposition of the absence or lack of his
75
privity or knowledge.
The privity or knowledge must be that of the owner
76
himself. In Lord v . G oodall. Nelson & Perkins S.S. Co.
18
77
( The Ventura ) , Judge Sawyer explained this aspect as
follows : "As used in the statute, the meaning of the words
'privity or knowledge', evidently, is a personal
participation of the owner in some fault, or act of
negligence, causing or contributing to the loss, or some
personal knowledge or means of knowledge of which he is
bound to avail himself of a contemplated loss, or a
condition of things likely to produce or contribute to the
loss, without adopting appropriate means to prevent it.
There must be some personal concurrence, or fault or
negligence on the part of the owner himself, or in which he
personally participates, to constitute such privity, within
the meaning of the Act, as well exclude him from the benefit
of its provision. ...It is the duty of the owner, however,
to provide ttie vessel with a competent master and a
competent crew, and to see that the ship, when she sails is
in all respects seaworthy. He is bound to exercise the
utmost care in these particulars ... and if by reason of any
fault or neglect in these particulars a loss occurs, it is
78
with his privity within the meaning of the act."
The situation becomes more complex in cases where the
ownership in a vessel rests with a corporation, as "... the
search in those cases [is] to see where in the managerial
79
hierarchy the fault lay." Early cases imputed to the
corporation only the privity or knowledge of managerial
80
employees, whereas more recent cases impute from a broad
81
group of supervisory personnel. It is interesting to
19
note, however, that the men actually going out to sea and
the shore staff who are usually of lower ranking, are
persons whose privity or knowledge does not affect a
82
corporate shipowner.
Finally, note should be made of the difference, if any,
of the "privity or knowledge" standard as opposed to the
"design or neglect" standard imposed by the Fire Statute
(section 182 of the Limitation Act). Early cases indicated
83
that different standards were involved, whilst the more
recent trend is expressed by Judge Huyett in Complaint of
84
Cal das as follows : "We shall treat the requirements of
'design or neglect' and 'privity or knowledge' as being
essentially identical."
4. Seagoing Vessel
Any vessel actually and intentionally at sea and any
vessel registered or licensed for the foreign, coastwise or
intercoastal trade is a seagoing vessel at all times and in
85
all waters. Since the five Great Lakes are, for United
States maritime purposes considered to be part of the high
86
seas, its vessels are also considered to be seagoing.
Section 188 of the Limitation Act provides that the
benefits under the Act apply to all seagoing vessels, and
also those used on lakes or rivers or in inland navigation,
including canal boats, barges or lighters.
Excluded from the term "seagoing vessel", however, for
purposes of section 183(b)-(e) [death and personal injury
20
7
provisions] is a list of vessels the common
characteristic of which seems to be that they do not carry
88
passengers for hire. The significance of these
exceptions is that it is only with respect to seagoing
vessels that an owner may be required to increase the
limitation fund (currently by $420 per ton) in order to
89
satisfy death and personal injury claims. This
situation presented itself in In re Diesel Tanker A.C.
90
Dodge , Inc
.
where the court had to decide whether the
A.C. Dodge was a seagoing vessel, or rather a "tank vessel"
which was excepted under section 183(f) from the (then) S60
per ton provision. The facts show that the A.C. Dodge
collided with another vessel in the Delaware river, and
after an explosion and subsequent fire the Dodge sank
causing the deaths of 8 of its men. The owners of the Dodge
filed a petition for exoneration and limitation which was
91
granted. Upon a subsequent hearing by the commissioner,
the owners contended that the Dodge was not a seagoing
vessel, but rather a tank vessel which is excepted under
section 183(f). The commissioner found, however, that the
Dodge was not a harbor or river type tank vessel, but indeed
a seagoing vessel, and although she operated for extended
periods in inland waters, she was nevertheless capable of
operating coastwise, was so licensed, and made several
92
coastal voyages. This report was approved by the court
93
and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
21
94
Pleasure boats have been held to be vessels subject
95
to limitation, but not seaplanes or offshore
96
structures .
E. LIMITATION FUND
Section 183(a) of the Limitation Act provides that,
absent privity or knowledge, a shipowner's liability "shall
not ... exceed the amount or value of the interest of such
owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending", thereby
distinguishing the two main elements which constitute the
limitation fund.
In addition the 1936 Loss of Life Amendments added, for
death and personal injury claims, a minimum fund and other
97
benefits. Once the fund is established, it is put up for
distribution among all claimants in proportion to their
respective claims.
It will be seen from the discussion below that the
methods of determining the fund are vague and inconsistent,
practically causing a situation where the greatest disaster
provides the smallest fund for its victims.
1. Interest in Vessels
The Act does not indicate at what point in time the
owner's interest should be valued. Whether the value of the
vessel is to be determined before or after the casualty has
long been a matter of considerable debate in which maritime
22
nations projected different views. English limitation law
holds the owner liable for the vessel's value immediately
prior to the collision, whilst the United States courts have
98
all along maintained the opposite view.
Thus, if the vessel is lost after the casualty, the
value of the owner's interest is limited to his interest in
99
the wreck which normally amounts to nothing. However,
if the vessel can be salvaged and repaired at a port of
refuge and thereafter completes her voyage, her repaired
value would be considered for limitation purposes, thereby
100
increasing the limitation fund.
The owner's interest would normally include all that
belongs to the ship and may be presumed to be his
101
property, including claims against third parties for
102
damage to the vessel. Excluded, however, are maritime
103
liens incurred on prior voyages, and the proceeds of
104
hull insurance.
The Flotilla Doctrine
The reference in section 183(a) to "such vessel"
(singular) creates a problem with respect to situations
where two or more vessels under common ownership are
involved in the same accident; for example a tug and her
tow. The question arises whether both vessels must be
surrendered or valued for purposes of the limitation fund,
or only the vessel found to be principally at fault.
23
Some confusion was caused by the Supreme Court's
decisions in Liverpool, Brazil & River Steam Navigation Co.
105
V. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal and Sacramento
106
Navigation Co. v. Salz . The former case involved a
collision between the owner's vessels (consisting of the tug
Intreped which was towing a car float and a disabled tug)
and the steamship Vauban which was moored to a pier. The
owner petitioned for limitation and surrendered only the
value of the tug Intreped to which the proctor for the
Vauban objected, claiming that the entire flotilla (all
three vessels belonging to the owner) should be surrendered.
The court held that the petitioning owner could limit his
107
liability to the value of the Intreped.
In the Sa 1
z
case, which was not a limitation
108
proceeding, the court held that a tug and barge were
one carrier and vessel, and distinguished its decision from
the Liverpool case by stating : "There the libel was for an
injury to a ship in no way related to the flotilla. It
was a pure tort - no contractual obligations were involved;
and the simple question was, What constituted the 'offending
vessel'? Here we must ask. What constituted the vessel by
which the contract of transportation was to be effected? a
109
very different question."
Thus, it would seem that the Liverpool principle is
limited to cases of pure tort, while Salz applies to cases
involving a contractual obligation. It is in the light of
these decisions that the doctrine has been criticized as
24
being "an unhappy illustration of our judicial process at
110
i ts worst .
"
Other cases on this point include Brown & Root Marine
111
Operators Inc. v. Zapata Offshore Co. where the court
held that the entire flotilla had to be surrendered in spite
of the fact that none of the vessels were connected at the
time of the accident. However, in South Carolina State
112
Highway Dept. v. Jacksonville Shipyard Inc. the court
held that only the value of the moving tug had to be
surrendered in a case where a barge, towed by a tug, struck
the Hilton Head Bridge.
2. Freight Pending
113
In The Main v . Williams Justice Brown commented
that "there is no reason ... for giving the word freight a
narrow and technical definition", and held that passenger
fares as well as all money payable for the carriage of goods
should be included.
Only money actually earned during the voyage constitutes
114
pending freight, meaning that should the voyage be
terminated short of destination thereby discharging the duty
of the shipper to pay, the freight that would have been
115
earned is not considered for the limitation fund.
On a round trip voyage where the event leading to the
limitation proceeding occurred on the return voyage, only
the freight in respect of the return voyage should be
116
considered "pending".
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3. Minimum Fund for Personal Injury and Death Claims.
117
The 1935 Amendments were passed to ensure that a
minimum fund is available to personal injury and death
claimants in cases where the basic fund (comprising of
vessel and pending freight) is insufficient to pay all
1 esses in f u 1 1
.
Section 183(b) of the limitation Act currently requires
that the limitation fund in such circumstances be increased
118
to an amount equal to $420 per ton to be available only
for the payment of losses in respect of such injuries or
loss of life. However, the owners of tugs, barges and
similar craft are in the favorable position that they are
119
excluded from these provisions.
4. Distribution of the Fund
It is appropriate to quote the following passage from
120
Moran Transportation Co. v. Mellino : "... the purpose
of limitation proceedings is not to prevent a multiplicity
of suits but, in an equitable fashion, to provide a
marshalling of assets - the distribution pro rata of an
inadequate fund among claimants, none of whom can be paid
in full".
Supplemental Rule F(8) provides that the fund is to be
divided pro rata among claimants in proportion to the
amounts of their respective claims, subject, however, to
claims enjoying legal priority.
26
121
In The Catskill the court allowed preference to
personal injury and cargo claimants over a negligent
vessel's claim for collision damages. Liens for supplies,
salvage costs and wreck removal costs have also been granted
122
pri ori ty
.
Generally, it would appear that innocent parties are
entitled to priority in the distribution of the fund : in
The George W. Roby the court stated that "... the claim of
an innocent cargo owner shall be preferred over the claim of
123
one whose fault contributed to the common disaster."
F. PROCEDURAL MATTERS
Genera 1
The owner of a vessel which was involved in a casualty
124
givinq rise to damage claims may petition the admiraltv
125
court to limit his liability and control a multiplicity
of suits by placing the value of the vessel, or the vessel
herself, together with the earnings of the voyage in the
control of the court. The court then enjoins all damage
claimants from maintaining separate suits and requires them
to file their respective claims in the limitation
proceeding.
Should the owner admit liability and the claimants
admit his right to limit that liability, the only
proceedings remaining are for the claimants to prove their
claims before a commissioner or referee, and the subsequent
27
distribution of the fund. However, if either issue is
contested, a trial will follow by which the owner could
126
either be exonerated from all liabilities, or granted
the right to limit his liability, or declared liable for
all damage claims without benefit of the limitation
127
statutes .
1. Forum
The Supreme Court already in 1871, in Norwich & N.Y.
128
Trans p . Co . v . Wright announced that the admiralty
court was the appropriate forum for limitation proceedings:
"Now, no court is better adapted than a court of admiralty
to administer precisely such relief ... We have no doubt
that the District Courts, as courts of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, have jurisdiction over the matter."
This position has always been reflected in the
129
Rules, which further seem to indicate that a claimant
can localize the proceedings in a district of his
130
choice. The venue is determined by the location where
the vessel has been proceeded against, or where the owner
has been sued, or where the vessel is actually located, or
^
if the vessel is not within any district and the owner has
not been sued, the complaint may be filed in any district.
Rule F{9) also provides for the transfer of proceedings
to a different district.
28
A distinction can be drawn between single-claim and
multiple-claim situations : In Petition of Tiedemann &
131
Co
.
it was stated that "where there is just one suit
or libel filed, the shipowner has no choice but to bring
his petition in the only court where litigation in the
particular matter is pending against his vessel. But where
... there are several causes of action pending when the
limitation petition is to be filed, there is nothing in the
rule which in any way indicates that it must or should
follow the venue of the first suit or suits".
The reason for this distinction is the inherent conflict
between the Limitation Act, which permits the shipowners to
force claimants to litigate in admiralty, and the Judiciary
Act of 1789 which grants suitors the right to pursue their
132
claims in non-admiralty courts.
Thus, when there is more than one claim, the need for a
concursus justifies the subordination of the claimant's
right to pursue in admiralty, but in single claim situations
the concursus is no longer necessary and the claimant may
133
pursue his claim in a non-admiralty court.
2 . Concursus
134
The concursus of claims in limitation proceedings
135
is regarded as the backbone of the limitation concept,
and has been viewed as being as much for the benefit of
136
claimants as it is for the petitioning shipowner.
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The purpose of concursus is, firstly, to prevent a
multiplicity of actions in different courts with the
137
possibility of varying results in different actions,
and secondly to avoid unfair preferences by a pro rata
138
distribution of funds among claimants. The Supreme
Court explained as follows: "Unless some proceeding of this
kind were adopted which should bring all parties interested
into one litigation, and all the claimants into concourse
for a pro rata distribution of the common fund; it is
manifest that in most cases the benefits of the act could
139
never be realized."
Exceptions to the consursus principle are cases in
which the aggregate claims are less than the value of the
limitation fund, and those in which there is only one
claimant - in both instances there is no need for a
140
concursus. With respect to single claimants the
141
Supreme Court in Langnes v . Green held that in cases
where it is clear that only claim will be involved, the
admiralty court should allow the state court to consider the
question of liability and limitation value, but the question
of limitation should be retained by the admiralty court. In
142
Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn where the claimant reduced
her claim below the limitation total in order to retain a
state suit, the Supreme Court held that unless a limitation
fund is inadequate, claimants must be allowed to pursue
their common law right to a jury trial in a state court.
30
3. BurdenofProof
The difference between limitation proceedings and an
ordinary lawsuit lies therein that the proceedings are
initiated by the vessel owner (seeking limitation) rather
than the claimant seeking recovery. Although it may be
expected that the shipowner will bear the burden of proof
for all the elements entitling him to limitation, it
nevertheless is not expected of him to prove his non-
liability. Instead, the courts have on several occasions
recognized that the burden of proof with respect to the
143
elements of liability remains with the claimants.
The burden of proof as to privity or knowledge is upon
the shipowner who must prove the negative proposition of the
144
absence or lack of his privity or knowledge.
With respect to seaworthiness, error of navigation or
due diligence the courts have placed the burden of proof on
145
the shipowner.
4. Transfer of Interest / Posting of Bond
When an owner files a petition for limitation of
liability, he must provide security for the benefit of
claimants, which can take any of the following forms :
(1) payment into court of a sum equal to the appraised value
of his interest in the vessel and freight pending, or
146
approved security therefor;
(2) transfer of his interest in the vessel and freight to a
147
trustee appointed by court.
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In addition he must also pay or give security for such
sums as the court may from time to time fix as necessary to
carry out the provisions of section 183, i.e. to make up the
$420 per ton fund required for death and personal injury
148
claims.
The owner must decide which form of action to take: if
the ship is still useful to him, he may choose to have it
appraised and furnish the court with security equal to the
appraised value, or pay such value in cash. If the ship is
in existence but useless to him, he may choose to transfer
her and the freight to a trustee appointed by the court. If,
however, the ship is a total loss, he will state these facts
149
and there will be no security payment or transfer.
5. Time Limitation
The 1936 Amendments introduced a time limit for the
commencement of limitation proceedings by providing that the
owner may petition for limitation within six months after
150
a claimant has given written notice of his claim. The
court appears to be without discretion to extend the six
months period, but it is not clear whether a claimant could
151
extend it by stipulation.
With respect to the transfer of the vessel or posting of
security by the owner it has been held that some deposit or
transfer of interest should take place within the six month
period, but the failure to post a large enough bond can be
152
corrected later.
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6. Valuation
It has been demonstrated above that an owner may, in
lieu of transferring his ship to a court-appointed trustee,
deposit with the court money or security equal to the value
of his interest, and since this method is favored by most
shipowners, the first step in limitation proceedings appears
to be the valuation of the shipowner's interest.
Value is intended to mean "fair market value" which can
be established in the following manner : by reference to
contemporaneous sales of like property: reproduction cost
less depreciation; purchase price; valued insurance
153
policies.
In Petition of Bloomfield Steamship Co. (The Ronda - The
154
Lucille Bloomfield ) it was stated : " The limitation
value was the value after the collision and the district
court correctly followed Norwich & N.Y. Transport v. Wright
in determining her limitation value to be her stipulated
sound value minus the cost of repairs."
Charter parties do not increase the value of the vessel
since vessels are valued as free on the open market without
reference to any benefit that miqht accrue under existing
155
contractual obligations. However, if a vessel is
repaired at a port of refuge, her value for valuation
156
purposes will be her repaired value.
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G. CHOICE OF LAW
Because of some principle differences between the United
States limitation law and that of other maritime nations,
claimants are likely to seek the law that is most
advantageous to them, practically meaning the law providing
for the greatest fund; similarly, petitioners for limitation
will seek the law providing for the smallest fund. Foreign
shipowners have for these very reasons petitioned American
courts to limit their liability, thereby enjoying the same
benefits that were structured and maintained for American
shipowners in spite of differing international
157
standards
.
Theoretically the courts have the following choices
available in determining which limitation law to apply: the
law of the forum; the law of the flag of the vessel for
which limitation is sought; the law of the nationality of
the party seeking limitation; or the law of the nationality
of the claimants.
In their choosing, the courts have been influenced by
158
considerations such as public policy, and confused by
motives such as Congress' original mandate to promote the
United States shipping industry on the one hand, and on the
other hand the modern trend to deny limitation, thereby
159
allowing fair compensation for claimants.
The courts have approached this problem by characterizing
the American limitation statute as procedural, thereby
34
adopting the choice-of-law rule that the lex fori governs
in procedural matters even though foreign substantive law
160
is applied.
Development through the cases :
Originally the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851
specified that the owner of "any ship or vessel" miaht
161
petition for limitation under its provisions. However,
the question whether the owner of a foreign vessel involved
in a collision outside the territorial waters of the United
States could petition in the U.S. courts remained unanswered
162
until the Supreme Court's decision in The Scot 1 and i n
1881.
In this case a collision occurred on the high seas
between an American and a British vessel. Action was
brought in a U.S. court, which stated : "If they [ships
colliding on the high seas] belonged to different nations,
having different laws, since it would be unjust to apply the
laws of either to the exclusion of the other, the law of the
163
forum ... would properly furnish the rule of decision,"
and went on to hold that "[W]e see no reason, in the absence
of any different law governing the case, why it should not
be applied to foreign ships as well as to our own, whenever
the parties choose to resort to our courts for
164
redress." This meant that foreign shipowners are
allowed to limit their liability in accordance with the
American Limitation Act.
35
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This rule was also applied in La Bourgogne , This
case followed the sinking of the French vessel La Bourgogne
after a collision with a British ship near Sable Island in
the Atlantic Ocean. Most of the passengers and crew were
lost. Suits were filed against the owner of the La
Bourgogne in U.S. courts which had to decide whether the
owners were protected by the Limitation Act. Limitation was
166
granted
.
This issue was next presented to the Supreme Court in
the landmark case of Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Mellor
167
( The Titanic ), which still today is being considered
the leading authority in this regard. The facts are shortly
as follows : The Titanic, a luxury passenger liner, was
sailing on her maiden voyage from Southampton to New York
when she collided with an iceberg in the late evening hours
of April 14, 1912. In less than three hours the ship,
together with over 1500 of the 2200 persons on board, sank
to the depths of the Atlantic Ocean. Only 14 lifeboats and
their equipment, valued together with the freight in passaqe
168
moneys for a mere $91 805.24, survived the loss. Death
claims amounted to $22 million, an amount far in excess of
the available limitation fund, regardless whether based on
British or American limitation law.
The owners of the Titanic filed a petition for
limitation of liability under the American Limitation Act
in the U.S. District Court, but was opposed by English and
American claimants arguing that since it was a British
36
vessel colliding on the high seas, British law should apply
and not American law as sought by the owners. British law
169
at the time provided for a bigger limitation fund.
The District Court held that the owners' liability had
170
to be determined under British limitation law. In its
analysis of all relevant cases the court held that the law
of no nation has an extraterritorial effect; ships on the
high seas form part of the country to which they belong;
tort liability is governed by the lex loci delicti ; and
under such circumstances the application of British
171
substantive law will be appropriate. It was
furthermore stated that Congress did not intend to favor
172
British shipowners by the United States Act.
173
On appeal three questions were certified to the
Supreme Court, the gist of which was whether a foreign ship
could seek limitation in the United States if her own law
provided for a different limitation and if so, which law
174
s hou Id apply .
The Supreme Court held that American law applies and
foreign shipowners may approach U.S. courts. Justice Holmes,
speaking for the Court, replied to the certified questions
by admitting that American substantive law "does not control
or profess to control the conduct of a British ship on the
high seas", and that "the foundation for recovery upon a
175
British tort is an obligation created by British law",
but he went on to say that "[The Limitation Act] does not
impose but only limits liability - a liability assumed
37.
already to exist on other grounds. The essential point [is]
that the limitation might be applied to foreign ships if
sued in this country although they were not subject to our
176
substantive law."
The court's reasoning was based on the view that the
Limitation Act is procedural in nature as a result of which
the law of the forum should be applied. This seems to be
177
the law today still.
This issue was next addressed by the Supreme Court in
194 9 in Black Diamond Steamship Corp. v. Stewart & Sons
178
( The Norwalk Vi cto ry ) following a collision between an
American vessel and a British ship on a Belgian river. The
shipowners filed a limitation petition in an American court,
and although the admitted value of the Norwalk Victory was
$1 million, the owners tendered security for only $325 000
based on Belgian law.
The owners contended that the Belgian limitation statute
attached to their substantive right, to which Justice
Frankfurter agreed by distinguishing the Titanic : "[W]e
turn to the question whether there are any circumstances
under which the Belgian limitation would be enforceable by
our courts ... if, indeed, the Belgian limitation attaches
to the right, then nothing in the Titanic, 233 U.S. 718,
stands in the way of observing that limitation. The court
in that case, was dealing with 'a liability assumed already
to exist on other grounds', id. at 733. But if it is the
law of Belgium that the wrong creates no greater liability
38
than that recognized by the Convention of 1924, we cannot,
without more, regard our own statutes as expanding the right
to recover. Any other conclusion would disregard the
settled principle that, in the absence of some overriding
domestic policy translated into law, the right to recover
for a tort depends upon and is measured by the law of the
179
place where the tort occurred ..."
This holding seemingly indicates that should limitation
be regarded substantive (attaching to the right), then
Belgian law will determine the owner's liability; on the
other hand, if procedural, American law will apply. Thus,
by contradicting the Titanic holding to a certain extent,
the Norwalk Victory created some confusion in subsequent
180
lower court decisions.
The holding in The Norwa Ik Vi ctory was followed by
Judge Mehrtens of the Southern District of Florida in I n re
181
Chadade S.S. Co. (The Yarmouth Castle ). In this case
the Yarmouth Castle, a Panamanian cruise ship burned and
sank on the high seas. Death, injury and property claims
amounted to more than $59 million. The shipowner, after
being sued in the United States filed petition for
limitation of liability under the American Limitation Act
and offered to surrender an ad interim stipulation of
$33 000.
The court, upon finding that the Panamanian limitation
law was substantive rather than procedural and attached
182
specifically to the right, ordered the petitioner to
39
file the greater amount required by the Panamanian
183
statute. The court's holding may be interpreted to
imply that foreign limitation law will be applied as
substantive if it sets higher limits of liability than the
184
American Limitation Act. This holding, understandably,
185
has been viewed by commentators with some doubt.
The Yarmouth Castle decision was disapproved in In re
186
Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corp. SA ., a case in which
a Panamanian flag ship burned on the high seas resulting in
extensive cargo damage but no death or personal injuries.
The owners, upon petitioning for limitation, posted a bond
under the American Limitation Act. Cargo claimants objected
by contending that the Panamanian statute should apply which
required a higher bond. After a careful examination of the
Titanic, The Norwalk Victory and The Yarmouth Castle, Judge
Tenney applied the rule of the Titanic, holding that it
187
"still is the controlling law in the instant case."
188
In In re Bethlehem Steel Corp. an American vessel,
the Steelton, collided with a highway bridge which spanned
the Welland Canal in Canada resulting in extensive damage to
the bridge and interrupting the voyages of other vessels.
The owner filed a petition for limitation in the Federal
Court of Canada, which entered an order limiting liability
189
to an amount computed under the Canadian act.
However, in response to a number of claims filed against
the owner in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio, the owner also there had to petition for
40
liability. The owner sought application of the Canadian act
which provided for a lesser limitation amount.
The issue before the District Court was whether Canadian
limitation law was procedural or substantive, and the court
held that it was procedural so that the law of the forum,
namely the U.S. statute, would determine the limitation
190
amount .
191
On appeal to the 6th Circuit, Judge Lively affirmed
the District Court's decision : "This conclusion ...
represents a desirable choice of laws decision. The
Steelton is an American ship ... [and] though the collision
occurred in Canadian waters, insofar as the limitation
between the present parties is concerned, the interest of
the United States in applying its own legislatively
determined concept of limitation is stronger than that of
Canada. This appears to be a proper case for the
192
application of the law of the forum."
To summarize, it would therefore seem that the following
conflict-of-law situations can be distinguished : first,
where the shipowner and the claimants are domestic, U.S. law
should be applied regardless where the incident took place;
second, if the shipowner is domestic and the claimants are
foreign, U.S. law should be applied since the overriding
193
purpose of the Act is to protect American shipowners;
third, when the shipowner is foreign and the claimants are
domestic, U.S. law may apply since by implementing the 1936
amendments Congress intended to treat foreign shipowners
41
equally with American shipowners; fourth, when all parties
are foreign, foreign law should apply since there is no U.S
194
interest in such an event.
Finally, the inference can be drawn that the United
States limit is the highest that can be imposed in U.S.
courts, meaning that if foreign law permits a limitation
fund that is higher than the American Limitation Act
provides, it would, to the extent of the excess, be of no
195
effect
.
H. THE 1976 CONVENTION
1. Introduction
In 1976 the world's maritime nations convened for a
196
third International Convention in an attempt to
standardize the diverse limitation of liability laws
197
implemented by the different nations.
The primary purpose of the co'n vent ion was to raise the
global limits of liability; to have them tied with an
international and value-stable unit of account; and, to
clear up the relationship between the different limitation
198
systems. At the same time the Convention justified the
continuation of the limitation concept by identifying the
following two principles as the underlying policy for
limitation today : firstly, the protection of shipowners
from bankruptcy; and secondly, the guarantee of
42
.
insurability, which is the ability of an owner to adecuately
199
insure the liability risks of a maritime endeavor.
Following the Convention the United States Maritime Law
Association (MLA) appointed a special committee to prepare
draft legislation which would be submitted to and is
200
currently being considered by the U.S. Congress.
2. Proposed Changes to the Limitation Act
For purposes of this study, the modifications brought
about by the Convention can be summarized as follows :
( i ) Who may 1 imi t
?
The list of persons entitled to limit was extended to
include practically anyone charged with the operation or
management of the vessel. The owner, charterer (demise cr
201 202
time), manager and operator of a seagoing ship,
203
salvors and any person for whose "act, neglect or
default" a principal party entitled to limit would be
204 205
responsible. A new addition is liability insurers.
(ii) What claims are subject to limitation?
Article 2 provides for claims in respect of loss of life
and personal injury; loss of or damage to property; losses
resulting from delays in the carriage of goods or
passengers; losses resulting from infringements of rights
other than contractual rights; the removal, destruction or
rendering harmless of wreck or cargo.
43
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(iii) Claims excepted from limitation include :
Salvage and general average claims; oil pollution
damage; nuclear damage; servant's claims.
(iv) Conduct rendering limitation
The U.S. concepts of "privity or knowledge" and "design
207
or neglect" have been the subject of much controversy
since they are poor guides to the investors concerning what
they should do or avoid in order to qualify for limitation.
The apparent vagueness of these terms has to a large
extent been diminished by the Convention where it provides
for a new standard in article 4 : "A person liable shall
not be entitled to limit his liability if it is proved that
the loss resulted from his personal act or omission,
committed with the intent to cause such loss, or recklessly
and with knowledge that such loss would probably result."
This provision offers far more protection to the shipowner
than does the "privity or knowledge" provisions, and seems
to impose a standard by which it will be very difficult to
break limitation. This should keep limitation amounts
208
within insurable limits at reasonable rates.
(v) The limitation fund
The most criticism of the American limitation system is
directed at its calculation of the limitation fund by
determining the value of the vessel and pending freight
44
after the accident. A significant change brought about by
the Convention is that the limitation amount is based on the
tonnage of the ship rather than its value after the
casua 1 ty
.
Provision is made for two separate funds : one in
respect of claims for loss of life and personal injury
209
calculated by reference to the tonnage of the vessel
or, in case of passengers, by reference to the number of
210
passengers; the other fund is in respect of any other
claims (property damage including damage to harbors, basins
and waterways) also by reference to the tonnage o'f' the
211
vessel
.
Article 8 provides the unit of account, namely the
Special Drawing Rights as defined by the International
Monetary Fund.
Article 10 provides that liability may be limited
without having to set up a fund, but this would be useful
only in cases where a single claim is filed against the
owner
.
(vi) Concursus
The Convention maintains existing limitation law in this
regard by providing a concursus proceeding with worldwide
effect, subject, however, to the formation of a limitation
212
fund
.
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I. CONCLUSION
The need for international uniformity of the world's
limitation of shipowner's liability laws has been due since
its conception. The United States Limitation of Liability
Act of 1851 has in the meantime become outmoded which could
be expected from an act that ancient in time and purpose,
and the courts have not been successful in conforming
judicial precedents to contemporary concepts of fairness.
Since the original purpose of the Act has been achieved,
namely to encourage investment in merchant shipping, it
would seem that, apart from maintaining or stimulating that
which has already been achieved, yery little justification
for its continued existence remains. The only potential
adverse effect of abolishing the system appears to be a
213
likely increase in insurance rates which in most cases
today merely represents an increase in business costs. This
certainly is not sufficient justification, and since the
protection afforded by the Act could be seen as an indirect
type of government subsidy offered to shipowners, it has
been argued that such "subsidies" should be paid from the
general revenues rather than from the pockets of
214
cl a imants .
Although it is suggested that the global limitation laws
eventually be abolished in t o t o , it is appreciated that no
nation could unilaterally afford to take such action as it
would put its shipping at a competitive disadvantage with
46
that of other maritime nations refraining from taking
similar action. Global abolishment can only be achieved by
international agreement, and previous conventions have
proved that it is virtually impossible to obtain consensus
on such issues.
Nevertheless, the 1976 Convention was a step in the
right direction and it affords yet another opportunity for
the United States to at least modernize its limitation laws
and also to put it on par with other leading maritime
215
nations .
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normal consequences of respondeat superior - The
Scotland, supra at 30-31.
the
Gilmore & Black at 877 remarked : "They d^re empty
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CHAPTER III
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF MARINE INSURANCE
A. INTRODUCTION
The ocean has always been the major link between the
world's diverse markets, and it will be fair comment to say
that international trade is largely dependent on maritime
commerce. Maritime commerce, in turn, is largely dependent
on marine insurance which is the instrument by which
shipowners and owners of cargo are safeguarded against the
immense risks and financial burdens associated with the
maritime adventure.
The law of marine insurance, which forms part of the
1
general maritime law, has its yery essence founded in the
concept of spreading these risks and distributing any losses
that might occur during these adventures. An Elizabethan
statute of 1601 stipulated : "By means of a Policy of
Insurance it cometh to pass that upon the loss or perishing
of any ship there followeth not the undoing of any man, but
the loss lighteth rather easily upon many than heavily upon
2
few."
62
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Marine insurance can thus be seen as that branch of
commerce which function it is to encourage merchants and
shipowners to trade to the full extent of their capacity,
unhampered by the fear of loss by fortuitous maritime perils
which they are unable to combat by the exercise of judgement
and foresight.
3
Although this is primarily a study into the American
law of marine insurance, due recognition has been given to
4
its British counterpart which is considered to be the
traditional home of marine insurance.
The purpose of this chapter is to acquaint the reader
with some general principles of marine insurance so that it
will contribute towards a better understanding of the
principal issues that are discussed in subsequent parts of
this work.
B. HISTORY
It is not the purpose of this work to search into the
antiquity of marine insurance, but it is nevertheless deemed
necessary to refer to certain historic developments which
contributed to the establishment of this fascinating
5
industry with its international character and practice.
1. Ancient
The concept of protection against loss caused by
maritime perils has been traced back to 215 B.C. when the
64
Roman Government was required by the suppliers of military
stores to accept "all risks of loss arising from the attacks
of enemies or from storms, to the supplies which they placed
6
in the ships."
The first conduct of the business of marine insurance on
7
a premium basis is associated with the merchants of the
8
cities of Lombardy in the thirteenth century. The
Lombards also established business communities in London,
Belgium and France where they ultimately practiced "marine
9
insurance".
2 . Engl and
The Lombards left England subsequent to the passing
10
of repressive measures aimed at them so that by the
sixteenth century the British marine insurance industry
11
vested largely in the hands of British traders.
Modern practice of marine insurance has its foundations
12
in Edward Lloyd's Coffee House on Tower Street, London,
13
dating back to 1688. It served as a meeting place for
merchants and businessmen interested in shipping, who formed
an association of underwriters for the purpose of providing
marine insurance. Each underwriter would assume a portion
14
of the risks set out with respect to a "ship" by simply
signing his name under (underwriting) whatever portion of
the risks he was willing to assume. In return he would then
15
get a fee in proportion to the risk assumed.
65
In 1871 Lloyd's was incorporated as a statutory entity
16
and the first Lloyd's Act was passed in the same year.
17
The first Marine Insurance Act was passed in 1745,
18
but it was repealed by the Marine Insurance Act of 1906
which is still in force today.
3. U.S.A.
The earliest record of the practice of marine insurance
in the United States seems to be a notice by certain John
Copson in the American Weekly Mercury of May 25, 1721
announcing that he had opened at his home in Philadelphia an
"Office of Publik Insurances on Vessels, Goods and
Merchandizes" in order to facilitate the local merchants who
at the time had to send to London for their insurance needs,
which was a tedious, troublesome and even precarious
19
process
.
It must be stated at the outset that unlike the British
practice of individual underwriters, the United States has
shown a preference for the corporate form of conducting the
20
business of marine insurance. This meant that after the
War of Independence, America's desire for an independent
commerce led to the establishment of the Insurance Company
of North America in 1792. New York soon followed with the
21
New York Insurance Company which was formed in 1798.
The U.S. marine insurance industry boomed during
and after the two World Wars, and the sy ndi ca te- type of
organization became the feature of the U.S. marine
66
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insurance market. These syndicates would unite U.S.
f
i
re-and-mari ne insurance companies and foreign companies
licensed to do marine underwriting in the U.S., extending
available facilities to the American shipping industry.
The practice of marine insurance in the United States
today still follows a policy of deferences to the British
practice, as do the U.S. courts follow English decisions
recognizing their greater experience and the desirability
23
of uniformity between the world's two greatest markets.
C. THE CONTRACT
1. The Insurance Contract in General
A contract of insurance has been defined as "... any
agreement or other transaction whereby one party, the
'insurer', is obligated to confer benefit of pecuniary value
upon another party, the 'insured' or 'beneficiary' dependent
upon the happening of a fortuitous event in which the
insured or beneficiary has, or is expected to have at the
time of such happening, a material interest which will be
24
adversely affected by the happening of such event."
The elements distinguishing a contract of insurance from
other contracts are: (i) insurable interest (ii) fortuitous
event (iii) risk transference, and (iv) risk distribution.
Since marine insurance falls within the category of
indemnity insurance, the rules applicable to insurance law
25
generally also apply to marine insurance.
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(i) It is reauired from the assured as a matter of public
policy to have an insurable interest in the insured subject
in order to prevent a situation whereby the assured could
26
make the occurrence of loss a means of gain;
(ii) The event giving rise to the losses must be
fortuitous, meaning that the happening of the fateful event
must not be within the reasonable control of the assured.
27
This element distinguishes insurance from warranties;
(iii) Risk transference takes place when the insurer takes
28
upon himself the risks to which the insured is exposed;
(iv) Closely related to risk transference is the element of
risk distribution. The latter is the yery essence of
insurance, namely to spread amongst many the loss of one,
thereby placing a small burden on the many instead of
exposing the one to disaster in the event of a loss.
2. The Contract of Marine Insurance
Marine insurance, like other types of insurance, is
founded on contract and defined by the Marine Insurance Act
1906 as :
"... a contract whereby the insurer undertakes to indemnify
the assured, in manner and to the extent thereby agreed,
against marine losses, that is to say, the losses incident
to marine adventure."
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2.1 Uberrimae fidei - the marine insurance contract is
based on the utmost good faith to be observed by the parties
thereto, and any misrepresentation or non-disclosure of a
29
material fact may render the contract void. The general
principle underlying this requirement is that all facts,
circumstances and information which could influence the
judgement of an underwriter in assuming the risk, should be
30
disclosed by the assured if within his knowledge. The
practicality of this requirement lies therein that the
underwriter often has to base his judgement entirely upon
the information given to him by the assured since it is not
always possible to check the accuracy of such information.
2.2 Policy - the instrument in which the contract is
embodied, the policy, sets forth the intention of the
contracting parties with respect to the subjects of
insurance, the risks and losses insured against, the
duration of coverage and generally the rights and
obligations of the parties.
2.3 Warranties - express or implied warranties are
undertakings by the assured, of a promissory nature, upon
the strict compliance with which the validity of the policy
31
depends .
Express warranties include those with respect to
nationality or neutrality, sailing warranties, convoy
warranties, warranties as to the position of a ship or as to
69
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the number of crew. An express warranty must be reduced
into writina and form part of the policy itself, regardless
33
where it appears.
Implied warranties are indispensable conditions which,
though not expressed on the face of the policy, are tacitly
34
understood. The assured, merely by entering into a
contract of marine insurance, is understood to warrant the
following conditions :
(i) seaworthiness - there is in every policy of marine
insurance an implied warranty that the vessel is seaworthy
when the policy takes effect, practically meaning that she
is competent to resist the ordinary attacks of the weather,
and that she is sufficiently equipped and competently manned
35
for the voyage;
(ii) no deviation - it is implied that the ship shall
pursue the course of her voyage in the usual manner, without
36
unnecessary deviation, risk or delay;
(iii) of legality - Section 41 of the Marine Insurance Act
states : "There is an implied warranty that the adventure
insured is a lawful one, and that so far as the assured can
control the matter, the adventure shall be carried out in a
lawful manner." In the United States illegality is
37
determined by the common law or by statute.
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D. SUBJECTS OF MARINE INSURANCE
Introduction
Generally speaking, any pecuniary or proprietary
interest which is exposed to risk by the perils of the seas
may form the subject of a contract of marine insurance,
38
unless its insurance is prohibited by law. The marine
Insurance Act in section 3(1) states : "eyery lawful marine
adventure may be the subject of a contract of marine
insurance", a marine adventure meaning to include ships,
goods or other tangibles that are exposed to maritime
perils; freight and other pecuniary benefits endangered by
the exposure of the insured property; and any liability to a
39
third party that may be caused by the assured.
1. Tangibles : Ship and Goods
(i) Ship - the primary subject of insurance is the
vessel, which includes not only the hull, but all things
essential to her navigation. Different items ere listed by
different forms of policies : the standard form of Lloyd's
policy lists these as "the body, tackle, apparel, ordnance,
40
munition, artillery, boat and other furniture", whereas
41
the American Institute Hull Clauses give a much wider
description.
(ii) Goods - also referred to as "goods and
42
merchandise", it constitutes cargo put on board the
43
ship for mercantile purposes. This covers such a wide
71
spectrum that it is more practical to rather list these
items which are excluded from the term goods, such as
44
personal affects, provisions and stores for use on
45 46
board, living animals and goods carried on
47
deck. Since container shipping has become the order
of the day, the question arose whether they should be
excluded as "goods carried on deck". The current position
is that containers are excluded and separate insurance is
48
effected in respect thereof.
2. Intangibles
Freight - the term "freight" denotes primarily the
money payable to a shipowner for the carriage of goods or
for the hire of his ship under a charter-party or other
49
contract of affreightment. Rule 16 of the First
Schedule to the Marine Insurance Act 1906 states that the
term freight includes : "the profit derivable by a
shipowner from the employment of his ship to carry his own
goods or movables, as well as freight payable by a third
50
party, but does not include passage money." Freight is
a subject of insurance by reason of the fact that it has a
pecuniary value separate from the value of the vessel or
cargo, but it can be lost to the shipowner if the vessel is
51
sunk or damaged beyond proceeding with the voyage.
52
Other intangibles include anticipated profits;
disbursements, as allowed under the Disbursements Warranty
53
in the hull policy; commissions on the sale of
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merchandise; master's wages; shipowner's liability
for the loss of life, personal injuries and damaae to
56
property .
E. RISKS INSURED AGAINST
Introduction
The contract of marine insurance provides coverage
against those risks associated with the maritime adventure.
A distinction has been drawn between marine risks and war
risks, both of which appear in the "perils clause" of the
57
standard forms of policies. War risks, including
piracy, are usually excluded from coverage under ordinary
marine policies by the Free of Capture and Seizure (F.C.& S
clause which at the same time provides separate coverage
58
for such risks.
The term maritime risks, better known as maritime
59
perils, is difficult to define because of its variety
and for the same reason it is beyond the scope of this work
to discuss eyery identified peril. The most common perils
60 61
include fire, barratry and the so-called perils of
62
the seas, the latter of which will form the subject of
this discussion.
1. Perils of the Seas
"Perils of the seas are understood to mean those perils
which are peculiar to the sea, and which are of an
73
extraordinary nature or arise from irresistible force or
overwhelming power, and which cannot be guarded against by
63
the ordinary exertions of human skill and prudence."
The term, as it is used in the policies, does not denote
a single peril, but rather a class of perils of indefinite
64
extent. The most common ones are : (i) foundering at
sea, when proximately caused by the fury of storms and
65 66
tempests; (ii) stranding; (iii) incursion of
67 68
seawater into the vessel; (iv) collision, not only
between navigable objects, but also between the insured
vessel and structures such as piers, harbors, bridaes and
69
wharfs
.
It is important to distinguish between loss proximately
70
caused by perils, and losses resulting from the natural
action of seawater, or of ordinary wear and tear which are
71
not recoverable as perils of the seas. The
distinguishing factor is that the peril insured against must
72
have the elements of fortuitousness and accident.
2. Additional perils under the Inchmaree Clause
Marine insurance coverage has been extended beyond the
above perils by the addition to the policy of the Latent
Defect, Negligence and Additional Perils Clause, commonly
73
known as the Inchmaree Clause. The general purpose of
the clause is to broaden and expand coverage to include
those risks or damages which are not proximately caused by
74
mari ne perils.
74
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Some of the risks covered by the Inchmaree Clause
76
include latent defects in machinery or hull; breakage
of shafts; bursting of boilers; accidents in loading,
discharging or shifting cargo or fuel; explosions; and
negligence of master and crew.
77
3. The "All Risks" Clause
A relatively modern development, especially with respect
to cargo insurance, was the introduction of the "all risks"
clause. This clause extends the range of insured perils
even further, by providing cover against all losses
78
attributable to external causes.
4. Proximate Cause and Excepted Perils
The Marine Insurance Act, in section 55(1) states that
the insurer is liable only for losses proximately caused by
a peril insured against, and further lists certain perils
79
which are excepted on the grounds of non-proximity.
80
The doctrine causa proxima non remota spectatur i s
81
applied strictly in marine insurance cases. However, the
United States Supreme Court went too far in the case of The
82
Sma ragd where it found that the spoiling of a perishable
cargo of bananas, which "was sound when shipped and would
have been merchantable on arrival after a normal voyage ...
had it not been for the delay due to the stranding of the
vessel", is proximately caused by the stranding and is
therefore within the coverage of insurance against loss
75
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caused by perils of the sea. The court went on to say
that "the proximate cause is the efficient cause, and not a
merely incidental cause which may be nearer in time to the
84
resul t .
"
It will be noticed that this decision is in direct
contrast to section 55(2)(b) of the Marine Insurance Act
1906; nevertheless, the international uniformity of the
marine insurance market prevailed and most cargo policies
soon incorporated a clause relieving underwriters of any
claim consequent on delay or loss of time, thereby in effect
nullifying the Sma ragd holding.
F. LOSSES
Introduction
Marine insurance distinguishes between total and partial
loss of the subjects insured. Total loss can either be
actual, for example where a ship sinks to the bottom of the
ocean and cannot be recovered, or constructive, in which
case the subject is damaged to such an extent that it is
considered a total loss, for example where repair costs
exceed the value of the damaged ship. In both cases of
total loss the assured mav recover from the insurer the full
85
amount for which the subject so lost was insured. Upon
payment of a total loss, the insurer becomes entitled to
ownership in the subject insured by abandonment, and obtains
certain rights against third parties by subrogation.
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1. Total Loss
(i) Actual Total Loss
Section 57(1) of the Marine Insurance Act states :
"where the subject-matter insured is destroyed, or so
damaged as to cease to be a thing of the kind insured, or
where the assured is irretrievably deprived thereof, there
is an actual total loss."
Thus, where it is no longer possible for a ship or its
cargo to arrive at their destination in specie, there was an
86
actual total loss. This can be brought about by
87 88
physical destruction (sinking, wreck, going
89
missing, or fire); loss of specie (breaking up or
alteration of goods or vessel to the extent that they are
90
unfit for their intended purpose); or irretrievable
91
deprivement (capture or theft).
The destruction concept referred to above may present
problems in distinguishing actual total loss from
constructive total loss in this modern day and age where
salvage and repair technology has become so advanced that
many "destroyed" vessels can be recovered and repaired.
This problem was presented in Edinburgh Assurance Co. v.
92
R . L . Burns Corp
.
,
where the court applied certain
standards under which an offshore oil exploratory platform,
which had collapsed in a storm, was held to be an actual
93
tota 1 loss.
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(ii) Constructive Total Loss
Where a subject of marine insurance is so damaged by a
94
peril insured against that it may be abandoned to the
insurer on account of its actual loss appearing to be
unavoidable, or it cannot be preserved from actual total
loss without an unreasonable expenditure, there is a
95
constructive total loss.
Although authorities in the United States indicate that
damage amounting to one-half the value of the insured
subject is sufficient to constitute a constructive total
96
loss, underwriters of policies en hull and machinery
require that the expense of recovering or repairing
97 98
exceed the insured value.
The calculation of recovery and repair costs takes into
account those expenditures necessary to deliver the ship
from its peril to a port of safety and thereafter make it a
99
seaworthy vessel. Included will be repair costs,
salvage expenses, dry dock and survey costs, pilotage and
100
towage, and superintendence. However, the restoration
of a stranded vessel to a state of "cosmetic perfection" is
not required, and costs associated therewith were held
101
exaggerated .
A constructive total loss is also justified when a
vessel is incapable of recovery or repairs within a
102
foreseeable time.
In order to recover for a constructive total loss the
103
assured is required to give due notice of abandonment
78
to the insurer, the latter to whom all rights in the
abandoned property are transferred upon payment of the
104
insured value to the assured.
105
2. Partial loss
The assured has a choice whether he wants to abandon and
claim for a constructive total loss, or keep and repair the
vessel and have his claim adjusted on a partial loss basis.
The assured is likely to make the latter choice when it
appears that the vessel's value is, in spite of the loss,
still higher than the insured value - he will then refrain
from giving a notice of abandonment and recover a claim for
partial loss up to the amount of the insured value, and
still retain ownership in the vessel which he can either
106
sell or have repaired.
G. PROCEDURE
Introduction
A policy of Marine insurance, like other contracts,
affords and confers upon the parties thereto certain
rights and obligations. The assured's rights include
indemnification by the insurer for losses insured against,
and the right to sue the insurer for non-performance; on the
other hand, the insurer's rights include the due payment
107
by the assured of premiums, the assured's duty of
disclosure to the insurer of all relevant facts and
79
circumstances that might affect the policy provisions, and
the right of subrogation.
In order to enforce these rights and obligations,
certain procedural rules need to be adhered to, and since
maritime law and marine insurance have an international
application, procedural matters often give rise to confusion
when applied locally. The following discussion will deal
briefly with some of these matters as they apply in the
United States.
1. Forum
In the United States all matters relating to maritime
108
law, including marine insurance, fall within the
109
jurisdiction of the Federal Courts. These courts are
divided geographically into thirteen Judicial Circuits, each
with its own Circuit Court of Appeals to which appeals are
taken from the Federal District Courts in that circuit.
Each of the fifty states has at least one District Court,
which in admiralty cases is the court of first instance.
2. Subrogation
Subrogation is an established principle of insurance law
whereby the insurer, upon payment of the assured's claim,
obtain the right to place himself in the position of the
assured to the extent of acquiring all the rights and
remedies of the assured in and with respect to the subject
110
insured, in particular the right to sue third parties
80
111
either in his own name or the name of the assured. In
exercising its rights of subrogation the insurer is limited
to recover from the third party only up to the amount paid
112
on the pol i cy
.
The right of subrogation is usually a term of the
contract contained in the policy, but can also be based on
113
equ i ty
.
3. Direct Action
114
Before the enactment by certain states of the
so-called Direct Action statutes, marine liability insurance
was indemnity, first party insurance which meant that
insurance was written solely for the protection of the
assured, with the result that an injured third party,
115
traditionally could not sue the insurer, but only had a
right of action against the assured, who in turn could bring
action against the insurer.
Not only did the direct action statutes nullify the
116
"no-action" clause, but also the customary provision
contained in many policies of marine insurance to the effect
that the insurer undertakes to pay such sums as the assured
shall have become legally liable to pay "and shall have paid
117
on account".
Apart from the fact that well-established and
fundamental principles of insurance law have been overridden
by these statutes, the right that an injured person now has
to sue the insurer directly does not alter the position of
81
either the insurer or assured in practice : the claimant
(injured third party) must still prove all the elements that
would be essential to a recovery by him against the
118
assured, and the insurer may still make any defenses
that it could have made had the action been brought by the
119
assured. However, special defenses personal to the
120
assured are not available to the insurer.
A further problem presented by the direct action
statutes is its affect on limitation of shipowners'
121
liability under the Limitation of Liability Act.
122
I n Maryland Casuelty Co. v. Gushing , a 4-1-4 split
decision by the United States Supreme Court caused much
confusion and uncertainty which still prevails today.
The issue presented to the court was whether the
Louisiana Direct Action Statute was in conflict with the
Federal Limitation of Liability Act or not. The single
judge holding, which was a method of conduct formulated by
Justice Clarke, became the mandate of the Court : it
prescribed that once the amount of the limitation fund has
been established in the limitation proceedings, the insurer
shall pay the insurance proceeds into the fund up to the
maximum limit of the fund. Only after the third party
claimants have been paid their pro rata share of the fund
under the limitation proceedings, may they proceed directly
against the insurer for the remaining portion, if any, of
123
their claims.
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H. TYPES OF MARINE INSURANCE
Introducti on
Traditionally, one type of insurance policy was used to
cover all the subjects exposed to risk during a maritime
adventure, namely the Lloyds' S.G. (ship and goods) form of
policy which was adopted in 1779. Today there ?ire basically
three types of marine insurance policies in use, namely
hull, cargo, and protection and indemnity (P&I) insurance.
Hull and cargo policies provide insurance for property,
whereas the P&I policy, together with part of the hull
policy, provide coverage for liability.
124
1 . Hull I nsurance
Hull insurance is taken out by the shipowner to obtain
coverage for the vessel and its equipment usually on a
125
time basis.
Hull insurance is primarily property insurance providing
coverage for physical damage to or destruction of the
insured property. However, in the 1836 English case of
126
De Vaux v . Salvador it was held that the hull policy
does not provide coverage for third party damages caused by
collision. This called for the introduction of the
so-called Running Down Clause (also known as the Collision
Clause) by which coverage is provided by the hull
underwriters for collision damages paid by the assured to
127
third parties.
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Other clauses that were introduced to the hull policy
include the Inchmaree Clause and the F.C.& S. (Free of
Capture and Seizure) Clause both of which have been
128
discussed above. Apart from these, certain miner
changes have been made from time to time in order to keep
coverage in pace with the times, but as a whole the hull
policy, through the skill of its drafters and its centuries
of tradition, has given the courts relatively little
129
trouble
.
2 . Cargo I nsurance
Cargo insurance is taken out by the shipper of goods to
obtain coverage against damage to or the loss of such goods
130
during a specific voyage.
The marine insurance market has for centuries used the
131
Lloyd's S.G. Policy Form in respect of cargo insurance,
but this form has been adapted and revised in order to meet
132
modern requirements.
3 . P&I Insurance
Originally, shipowners' liability to third parties was
relatively insignificant and borne by the shipowners
themselves. However, the situation has changed drastically
in modern times and liability suits with huge claims
constantly pose a threat to shipowners who find themselves
exposed to a long list of potential liabilities in the daily
133
conduct of their business.
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This list of potential liabilities was made even longer
134
by extensive legislation which protects passengers,
crew, the environment and others, together with the fact
that there has been a remarkable growth in the number and
size of ships.
As marine policies provided almost no liability cover,
insurance having been limited to hull policies by shipowners
on their ships and cargo policies by owners on their goods,
a desperate need arose for marine liability insurance.
This need prompted shipowners to form mutual insurance
associations, commonly known as Protection and Indemnity
(P&I) Clubs.
These clubs, first introduced in the United Kingdom,
are associations of similarly exposed persons which provide
their shipowner members with insurance cover on a
135 136
mutual, non-profit basis against legal liabilities
137
arising out of the operation of their ships. Each
member of the club is proportional underwriter for and
138
insured by all the other members.
The certificate of entry, which is issued to the
shipowners subsequent to his application to become a member,
forms the actual contract of insurance under English P&I
139
practice. The member is required to pay his
140
contribution in advance for each policy year and
qualifies forthwith to recover an indemnity for his loss
from the association.
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In the United States, however, P&I practice is somewhat
different. Instead of a "certificate of entry", American
P&I clubs issue a policy document which forms the contract
141
of insurance. A new standard form of policy, the AIMU
Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Clauses, was adopted in June
142
1983.
The coverage provided by P&I insurance is generally in
respect of those liabilities which are not covered under
the Hull policy. The next chapter will look at these
liabilities.
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the final profits would be. See also Unson, Insurance
on Expected Profits
,
19 Phil. L.J. 390 (1940).
However, loss of profits for goods not shipped is not
covered - Arnould, par. 319.
Constituting money already expended on a ship - Gilmore
& Black, at 58 n.35 and accompanying text; Haehl, The
Hull Policy : Additional Insurance Permitted
,
41 Tul.
L. Rev. 315 ( 1967) at 318 n. 12.
54. Arnould, par. 321.
55. Id. par. 324; however, seamen's wages and goods are
excluded - id. par. 323.
56. Id. par. 329.
57. Arnould, Vol.11 par. 790 at 650 for the English form of
policy; Buglass, MARINE INSURANCE CLAIMS, supra at 6
and 149-50 for the American Institute Hull Clauses.
58. Haehl, The Hull Policy : Coverages and Exclusions
Frequently Employed
,
41 Tul. L. Rev. 277-79 (1967).
Gilmore & Black, at 72 n.80 and accompanying text;
T. J.Schoenbaum & A.N. Yi annopou 1 os , ADMIRALTY AND
MARITIME LAW (1984) at 547.
59. A definition is provided by the Marine Insurance Act,
1906 in section 3.
60
61
William Waters v. The Merchants' Louisville Ins. Co.
36 U.S. 213 (1837) .
Willful acts by master and crew
owner - National Union Fire Ins
China, 254 F.2d 177 ( 1958) ,
International Petroleum Co.
1958
Ltd.
to the prejudice of the
Co. V . The Rep . o f
A.M.C. 721; Shell
V. Gibbs (The Salem)
,
(1981) 2 Lloyd's L.R. 316
62. Rule 7 of the Rules for Construction of Policy states
"The term 'perils of the seas' refers only to
fortuitous accidents or casualties of the seas. It
does not include the ordinary action of the winds and
waves," - Chalmers, at 154.
63. The Giulia, 218 F. 744, 746 (2d Cir.
Jones Lumber Co. v. Roen SS Co., 270
(1959).
1914) ; also R
F.2d 546, 548
T.
64. Arnould, Vol.11 par. 791 at 652.
91
65. Id. par. 793 at 654; Arbib & Houlberg
Ins. Co. , 294 F. 811, 816 (1923) .
Second Russian
66. Lanasa Fruit SS & Importing Co. v. Universal Ins. Co.,
302 U.S. 556, 561 (1937); Liverpool & Great Western
Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397, 438;
Arnoul d
,
par . 795
.
67. Arnould, par. 793; however, where the incursion of
seawater was caused by the deliberate acts of the crew,
the element of fortuitousness lacks, and therefore it
is not a peril of the seas - Samual v. Dumas
,
(19 24
A.C. 431) as cited by Arnould at 654 n.l4.
68. Peters v. Warren Ins. Co., 39 U.S. 99 (1840) : "In a
just view of the matter, the collision was the sole
proximate cause of the loss; ... It was an incident
inseparable connected, in contemplation of law, with
the sinking of the galliot; and a damage, immediate,
direct and positive, from the collision," id. at 108
69. Richelieu & Ontario Nav
136 U.S. 408 (1890) .
Co Boston Marine Ins. Co.
70. Only winds and waves of extraordinary nature are sea
perils - Gilmore & Black, at 73 n.82.
71. Arnould, Vol.11 par. 798 at 695.
72. Lord Herschell made the following statement in The
Xantho
,
(1887) 12 App. Cas. at 509 : "The purpose of
the policy is to secure an indemnity against accidents
which may happen, not against events that must happen,"
- cited by Chalmers, at 154.
73. Jim Austin and Aulemic Inc. v. Servac Shipping Line et
a2. , 79
derived
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installations or reactors not on board the insured
Vessel; Contact with aircraft, rockets or similar
missiles, or with any land conveyance; Negligence of
Charteres and/or Repairers, provided such Charterers
and/or Repairers are not Asured(s) hereunder;
Negligence of Master, Mariners, Engineers or Pilots;
provided such loss or damage has not resulted from want
of due diligence by the Assured, the Owners or Managers
of the Vessel, or any of them."
Saskatchewan Gov't. Ins. Office v. Sport Pack Inc.,
1957 A.M.C. at 655.
Arnould, Vol.11 par. 831 at 696-702. Also Tropical
MarineProducts Inc. v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. of
Pennsylvania
,
247 F.2d 116 (Fifth Cir.) at 119-123,
cert, denied, 355 U.S. 903 (1957); discussed by
Tetreault, The Hull Policy : The "Inchmaree" Clause
,
41 T. L. Rev. 325 (1967) at 325-328.
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1980) .
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80. "The proximate and not the remote cause must be looked
at".
81. William Waters v. The Merchants' Louisville Ins. Co.,
supra .
82. Lanasa Fruit SS. & Importing Co. v. Universal Ins. Co.,
302 U.S. 556 (1937).
83. Id. at 561-62.
84. Id. at 562.
85. Roux V. Salvador
.
[(1836) 3 Bing N.C. 266], where Lord
Abinger stated at 286-287 : "The underwriter engages
that the object of the assurance shall arrive in safety
at its destined termination. If, in the progress of
the voyage, it becomes totally destroyed or
annihilated, or if it be placed, by reason of the
perils against which he insures, in such position, that
it is wholly out of the power of the assured or of the
underwriter to procure its arrival, he is bound by the
wery letter of his contract to pay the sum insured."
86. Gilmore & Black, at 83 n.ll6 and accompanying text;
Arnould, par. 1136 : "The great principle therefore,
on which all the cases of actual total loss depend,
appears to be this - The impossibility, owing to the
perils insured against, of ever procuring the arrival
of the thing insured."
87. Burt V. Brewers' & Malsters Ins. Co., Hun 383 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1876), cited by Gilmore & Black, at 83 n.ll7.
88. Even where the ship is not a complete wreck, but
nevertheless is irrepairable and necessarily sold by
the master where she lies, there is a total loss -
Arnould, Vol.11 par. 1146 at 937. However, where the
vessel is seriously damaged but remains afloat, there
is no actual total loss - Lenfest v . Col dwel 1 , 5 2 5 F . 2
d
717 (19 7 5).
89. Section 58 of the Marine Insurance Act provides :
"Where the ship concerned in the adventure is missing,
and after the lapse of a reasonable time no news of her
been received, an actual total loss may be presumed."
90. Great Western Ins. Co. v. Fogarty, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.)
640 (1874). In this case the parts of a machine were
delivered in a condition not capable of its intended
use, and it was held to be a total loss on the grounds
that it was a destruction in specie.
94
91. Buglass, supra , at 15; Gilmore & Black, at 83 n.ll8 and
accompanying text.
92. 479 F.Supp. 138 (1979).
93. Id. at 158.
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d by the insurer. However, insurers usually
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ion see Lord, The Hull Policy : Actual and
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Rev. 347.
95. Marine Insurance Act, section 60. Arnould
distinguishes between constructive and actual total
loss in stating : "the latter is a total loss in law
and in fact; the former is a total loss in law, and
must be converted, by a properly notified abandonment,
into a total loss in fact, to entitle the assured to
claim a total loss against his insurers" - Arnould,
par. 1168 at 954.
96. Continental Ins. Co. v. Clayton Hardtop Skiff, 367 F.2d
230 (1966); Gilmore & Black at 84 n.l23.
97. The American Institute Time (Hulls) fo
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98. In Asphalt InternatJonaT Inc. v. Enterprise Shipping
Corp. S.A.
,
[514 F. Supp. 1111, 1113 (198I)J, it was
held, that where a vessel Is excessively over Insured,
the standard to be applied is not the insured value of
the ship, but rather the fair market value.
99. The Armar, 1954 A.M.C. 1674.
100. Id. at 1676-77.
101. Id.
102. The Partmar, 1954 A.M.C. 558.
103. Notice of abandonment is the act by which the assured
communicates to the insurers
a constructive total loss.
abandonment has been given,
by the assured Implying the
is denied sufficient "notice
INSURANCE CLAIMS : AMERICAN
his elction to claim for
Even where no notice of
it was held that actions
intention of abandonment
- Buglass, MARINE
LAW AND PRACTICE, at 17.
104. The Republic of China, 1958 A.M.C. 1529
105
106
Section 64 of the Marine Insurance Act provides:
"(1) A particular average loss is a partial loss of
the subject-matter Insured ... which is not a general
average loss." Section 71 of the Act deals with the
partial loss of goods, merchandise and other movables
Aetna Insurance Co.
436; In re Central R
101 F. 469, 470.
V. United Fruit Co., 304 U.S. 430,
Co. Of New Jersey (The St. Johns)
107. Premiums are based on the underwriter's estimate of
the hazards or risks involved in particular adventures
and which are within the terms of the contract policy.
108. De Lovio v. Bolt, supra , followed by Insurance Co. v.
Dunham, 78 U.S. I (1871) .
109. The United States Contitution Article III section 2
states that the judicial power of the courts of the
United States extents to "all cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction." It was by the Judiciary Act
of 1789 that Federal District courts were specifically
granted jurisdiction.
110. Marine Insurance Act, section 79 (10).
111. Gilmore & Black par. 2-17 at 91.
112. Aetna Insurance Co., supra at 436.
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.
The "no-action" clause contained in most policies
limited the right of recovery against the insurer to
the assured, and only after judgement had been
obtained against and paid by the assured. Should the
assured not be able to satisfy the judgement due to
his insolvency or any other reason, the injured third
party skill had no right of action or recovery against
the insurer. This unjust situtation motivated state
legislators to pass the direct action statutes.
116. By creating a direct relationship between the insurer
and the third party claimant.
117. Olympic Towing Corp. v. Nebel Towing Co
(1969), cert, denied 397 U.S. 989.
118. Duke V. Hoch, 468 F.2d 973 (Fla.1972).
419 F.2d 230
Rushing v .
(N.Y. 1929)
Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 167 NE 450
Such as the special immunity from suit which may be
enjoyed by the tortfeasor (assured). The insurer also
could not avail himself of the defense of limitation
of liability under the Limitation Act (46 U.S.C.
section 183), because the limitation defense has been
held to be personal to the insured shipowner,
practically meaning that the insurer will be liable
for damages up to the policy limits - In re
Independent Towing
.
242 F.Supp. 950; Olympic Towing v.
Nebel , supra . However, in a recent decision of the
5th Circuit in Crown Zellerbach v. Ingram Industries ,
1986 AMC 1471, the above decisions were overruled.
121. 46 U.S.C. sections 183-189.
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128
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130
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133
134
347 U.S. 409, 74 S.Ct. 608, 98 L.Ed. 806 (1954).
Id. at 425. Also Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Barge W-701
468 F.Supp. 802, 815-816 (E.D. La. 1979), aff'd. 654
F.2d 1164, 1982 A.M.C. 2603 (5th Cir. 1981).
For a detailed
Hull insurance
SYMPOSIUM ON THE HULL POLICY,
Rev. 231 et. seq. (1967).
discussion of all aspects relating to
,
see the ADMIRALTY LAW INSTITUTE'S
published in 41 Tul. L
Time policies are to be distinguished from voyage
policies in that the latter provides coverage (usually
in respect of cargo) only for a specific voyage,
whereas time policies provide coverage for a period of
time stipulated in the policy.
4 Ad.& E. 419, 111 E.R. 845 (K.B. 1836).
In the U
Ins
. Co .
the same situation arose in General Mutual
Sherwood (The Emily ), 55 U.S.
_
( 14 How. )
351 (1852) - Eastham, The Hull'Policy : The Running
Down Clause
,
41 Tul. L. Rev. 399-400 ( 1967) .
See footnotes 73 and 58 respectively.
Unlike hull insurance which provides coverage on a
time basis.
"S.G." stands for "Ship Goods" indicating that the
form could be used with respect to ship and/or goods.
The Lloyd's S.G. Policy has been revised recently and
replaced by a new Lloyd's policy - see Mankabady, The
New Lloyd's Policy and Cargo Clauses
,
13 Journal of
n^Maritime Law and Commerce (1982) 527
.
Reynardson, The History and Development of P&I
Insurance : The British Scene
,
43 Tul. L. Rev
464 ( 1969) . Also 43 Tul
457,
475.
The Jones Act, 1920, 46 U.S.C.
on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C
Ship Compulsory Insurance Act,
section 688; the Death
section 761; Passenger
46 U.S.C. 817 d, e.
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135. Mutual insurance differs from the usual insurance
"for profit" in the following respects : firstly, the
association is organized solely for the benefit of its
members; secondly, the association is controlled by
the members themselves; thirdly, member's
contributions for the losses of a member beneficiary
substitute for the ordinary premium requirement -
Chalmers, at 137; Dover, supra at 507.
136. Liabilities ex delicto (eg. damage to ships, piers,
docks and bridges, caused by collision); ex contractu
(eg. under contracts of affreightment for unreasonable
deviation, unseaworthiness or damage to cargo); ex
1 ege (eg. violations of acts such as the Jones Act,
Wreck Rumoval Act and pollution laws).
137. Dover, at 471. Activities of P&I clubs are not
limited to providing their members with insurance
cover, but also to provide services such as assisting
members in the handling and defense of third party
claims; providing security and guarantees to prevent
or release members' ships from arrest; undertaking
maritime research; participation in shipping
legislation and international maritime conventions.
138. Chalmers , at 137 n.8.
139. It contains the rules and regulations of the club,
describes the risks insured against, and sets out the
period of insurance.
140. Originally, contributions were paid only as and when
expenses and losses were incurred, but modern practice
requires payment in advance in order to establish a
mutual insurance fund to meet expected or estimated
expenses and payments.
141. Healy, Comparison of the American Club and the SP-23
Forms of Policies with the AIMU P&I Clauses of June 2
,
7983 , First Addenda to Marine P&I Policy Annotations
( 1985 ) , published by the American Bar Association, at
31.
142. Id
CHAPTER IV
MARINE LIABILITY INSURANCE
A. SOURCES
Intro duct ion
The purpose of marine liability insurance is to
indemnify the shipowner for damage done to others by the
shipowner or his lawful agents. Originally, marine
insurance underwriters did not offer coverage for
shipowners' liability towards third parties causing such
third parties damage or harm. Liability suits were rare,
and those that succeeded were borne bv the shipowners
1
themsel ves
.
A need for liability insurance arose especially in the
latter part of the 18th century and the early part of the
19th century : a great expansion in export cargoes together
with a dramatic increase in emigration from Europe to the
United States and Australia, resulted in more and bigger
ships with a consequent increase in the number of crew
c
employed. All these factors increased the shipowners'
exposure to liability, especially in regard to loss of life
3
and personal injury to passengers and crew.
99
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Today, the shipowner basically has two sources from
which he can obtain liability insurance : firstly, the hull
policy's Running Down Clause (also referred to as the
Collision Clause), and secondly, Protection and. Indemnity
(P&I) insurance. The former is limited to liability for
collision damages, whereas the latter is extensive in its
scope to cover practically all those liabilities which are
not covered under the Hull Policy.
1. Collision Clause
5
It was the English decision of De Vaux v. Salvador
and the subsequent introduction of the so-called Running
Down Clause in the basic Hull form of policy that for the
first time specifically provided the shipowner with
liability insurance against collision damages to other
vessels. In the United States a similar situation presented
6
itself in The Emi ly where the Supreme Court denied
coverage under the basic hull policy of the insured vessel
against liability for collision damages to the other vessel.
The Collision Clause was first made available on an
"upon request" basis, affording protection in the form of an
indemnity to the assured for damages which he "becomes
liable to pay and shall pay" to the other vessel on account
of a collision caused by the negligent navigation of the
7
insured vessel. Although it forms part of the Hull
policy, which is primarily a policy for the insurance of
101
property, the Collision Clause is written as a separate
8
covenant
.
The English hull underwriters limited the coverage
under the Collision Clause to three-fourths of the assured's
liability, leaving the remaining one- fourth on the
shipowner's shoulders with the purpose of giving an
9
incentive for more prudent and careful navigation. In
the United States, however, four-fourths coverage is
provided by hull underwriters.
The Collision Clause also makes provision for the
payment of certain costs associated with legal proceedings
10
that the assured may institute.
11
Those items that are specifically excluded from the
Collision Clause, namely :
"(a) removal or disposal of obstructions, wrecks or their
cargoes under statutory powers or otherwise pursuant to law;
(b) injury to real or personal property of ewery
description;
(c) the discharge, spillage, emission or leakage of oil,
petroleum products, chemicals or other substances of any
kind or description whatsoever;
(d) cargo or other property on or the engagement of the
Vessel ;
(e) loss of life, personal injury or illness,"
are covered by Protection and Indemnity insurance.
102
2. P&I INSURANCE
The need for insurance coverage in respect of a wide
spectrum of liabilities prompted shipowners to form mutual
insurance associations, better known as P&I clubs, which
would provide such coverage on a mutual, non-profit basis to
its members, all of whom share a common interest in the
operation of their ships.
Initially the need arose to provide coverage in respect
of the shipowner's exposure to the one-fourth collision
damages which was not covered by the hull policy's Collision
Clause. A more important need arose for coverage against
claims for loss of life and personal injury, a phenomenon
that increased in frequency and size of suits, but yet
12
enjoyed no coverage.
P&I insurance was to become "the complement to collision
13
insurance", for it did not provide coverage for any
liability which was already insured under the Hull policy.
A standard form of policy which is used by American F&I
14
underwriters, contains a general clause by which the
assured is indemnified "against any loss, damage or expense
which the assured shall become liable to pay and shall pay
by reason of the fact that the assured is the owner or
operator, manager, charterer, mortgagee, trustee, receiver
15
or agent, as the case may be, of the insured vessel".
More specifically, coverage is provided for :
(i) Loss of life, injury and illness of any person; this
16 17
includes crew members, longshoremen and passengers.
103
(ii) Liability for repatriation expenses necessarily
incurred in respect of any person on board the insured
18
vessel ;
(iii) Collision liabilities not covered by the four -
fourths collision clause in the American Institute Hull
Clauses : this includes all expenses of and damages to
another ship in consequence of a collision between the
insured vessel and such other vessel, or damages done by
another ship to piers, wharfs, bridges or harbors due to
19
the fault of the insured vessel.
It is important to note that American P&I policies
exclude coverage for shipowners' liability in excess of the
20
coverage provided for collision under the hull policy.
(iv) Damage caused otherwise than by collision, such as
damage resulting from waves created by the insured vessel
while proceeding at excessive speed in narrow or crowded
waters, or damage caused by propeller suction or as a result
of the dropping of cargo on vessels alongside the insured
21
vessel
.
22
(v) Liability for loss of or damage to cargo;
(vi) Expenses of investigation and defense;
23
(vii) Liability for wreck removal or oil pollution;
(viii) Fines, penalties and other miscellaneous
liabilities.
The above list is not exhaustive, but gives an
impression of the diversity of potential liabilities for
which the shipowner requires insurance protection.
104
In cases of marine catastrophe it may well be that
losses exceed the protection provided by the P&I policy.
The shipowner can, for these purposes take out so-called
25
Bumbershoot insurance which provides coverage for excess
P&I. The Bumbershoot policy responds only after other
available insurance have been exhausted, and if losses are
not covered by other insurance, this policy will take up
the loss against payment by the assured of a specified
26
deductible.
B. INDEMNITY OR LIABILITY ?
An important distinction can be drawn between indemnity
policies on the one hand, and liability policies on the
other hand. It might appear academical at first sight, but
it will be demonstrated in the following discussion that
certain far reaching practical problems can arise if such
distinction is ignored.
1. Nature of Indemnity Insurance
The object of a policy of marine insurance is to
indemnify the assured against losses arising from the perils
insured against, meaning that the assured will be placed in
27
the same position that he would have been in, had the
event causing the loss not taken place.
Indemnity is not only provided in respect of property,
but also includes the interest in such property - hence the
105
requirement that the assured must have an insurable interest
28
in the property insured. The significance of this
29
distinction will be discussed below.
Indemnity insurance is first party insurance, meaning
that the benefit or proceeds of the insurance accrue only to
the assured, exclusive of any third party.
A final characteristic of indemnity insurance that need
mentioning is the fact that the insurer undertakes to
indemnify or make whole the assured only after he has
30
incurred the loss or has been compelled to make payment
2. Nature of Liability Insurance
A policy of liability insurance is a contract whereby
the insurer assumes the risk of liability of the assured for
31
damages to the person or property of a third party.
It is called third party insurance because the proceeds
32
under the policy accrue to the injured third party.
The purpose of liability insurance is to shield the
assured from being required to make payment on a claim for
33
which he is liable; the insurer is required to make
payment even though the assured has not suffered any
monetary loss by way of payment to the third party.
3. Distinction between Indemnity and Liability Insurance
Indemnity insurance covers first party (assured's)
losses, whereas liability insurance covers injuries and/or
34
damages sustained by third parties.
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In American Employers' Liability Insurance Co. v.
35
Fordyce
,
the Arkansas Supreme Court drew the following
distinction : "The difference between a contract of
indemnity and one to pay legal liabilities is that upon the
former an action cannot be brought, and a recovery had,
until the liability is discharged; whereas upon the latter
the cause of action is complete when the liability
36
attaches."
The effect of this distinction is best illustrated in a
contract of liability insurance containing a "no-action"
37
clause ; although principally a liability policy, it
loses that character to become one of indemnity because it
protects the assured from liability rather than the third
38
party from loss.
4. Practical Significance of the Distinction
The interrelationship between marine liability
insurance, state direct action statutes and the Federal
Limitation of Liability Act has been problematic at least
since the U.S. Supreme Court's split decision in Mary 1 and
39
Casuelty Co. v. Cushing . As a result, the lower courts
have been inconsistent in their subsequent reasoning, and
the shi powner-a ssu reds and liability insurers have been
uncertain about the extent to which they would be held
liable in case of a disaster causing third parties damage
or harm.
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The following discussion looks at the direct action
statutes of Louisiana and New York, together with some
related case law in an attempt to demonstrate that the root
of the problem (and resultant inconsistency of the courts)
is, amongst others, this distinction between indemnity and
liability with respect to marine liability insurance.
40
4.1 Louisiana Direct Action Statute
41
Considered as the most liberal of these statutes,
the Louisiana Direct Action Statute has been under the
scrutiny of numerous courts and commentators. The reason
for this is evident : it so strongly seeks to protect the
interests of injured third parties, that in the process it
does not take into account certain fundamental principles of
law, in this case the insurance law principle that liability
42
insurance is for the protection of the assured.
43
By allowing third party claimants to recover losses
directly from the insurer without first having to attempt a
recovery from the assured, the statute seemingly does not
take cognizance of the fact that policies of marine
insurance, including P&I policies, are for the indemnity of
the assured. It in effect converts an indemnity policy
into a liability policy, because it creates a direct
relationship between the insurer and the third party
claimant, a relationship that would otherwise not exist.
The practical consequence is that it is not the assured
being indemnified, but rather the third party claimant
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being compensated. It is furthermore likely that the
insurer will be called upon to pay the third party claimant
up to the insured amount, whereas under normal circumstances
the insurer would only have to indemnify the assured,
meaning that he would only have to reimburse the assured for
that amount which the latter is held liable, which could be
less than the insured amount in cases where the assured
could limit his liability by invoking the provisions of the
Limitation Act.
The following hypothetical will demonstrate this problem
: Shipowner A is the assured under a P&I policy with
insurer B for indemnity against third party liabilities to a
maximum of $20 million. Shipowner A's passenger ship sinks
and in the disaster some passengers and crew members are
killed and injured, giving rise to claims amounting to $16
million. A petition for limitation of liability succeeds
and shipowner A's liability is limited to $500 000,
representing the value of some lifeboats that were rescued
after the ship sank to the bottom of the ocean. After all
other sources of recovery are exhausted the third party
claims still amount to $5 million for which they institute
direct action against insurer B. In accordance with the
direct action statute, B has to pay the $5 million, whereas
he would otherwise only have to indemnify the assured A,
which would amount to $500 000.
Situations similar to the above hypothetical have often
been presented to the Louisiana courts, the following of
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which should suffice to demonstrate how the issue was
addressed :
(i) An appropriate starting point is the 4-1-4 split
decision of the Supreme Court in Maryland Casuelty Co. v.
44
C u s h i n g . In this case the representatives of five
drowned seamen brought action under the Louisiana Direct
Action statute against the liability insurers of the owner
of a tow-boat that sank in a Louisiana river. The main
issue presented to the court was the co-existence of two
45
inherently conflicting statutes, namely the Federal
46
Limitation of Liability Act and the Louisiana Direct
47
Action statute, and whether the latter infringed upon
48
the federal admiralty power. Justice Clark's opinion to
the effect that both statutes apply, became the sanction of
49
the court.
Of more relevance and importance for this discussion is
the insurer's contention that the policy sued upon was one
of indemnity, whereas the Louisiana Statute applies only to
50
Liability insurance. The question raised by this
contention is, therefore, whether a P&I policy, which is
generally considered a contract of indemnity, precludes a
direct action against the insurer. The Supreme Court
unfortunately did not discuss this point, but reference
should be made to the lower courts' opinions.
51
The District Court judge dismissed the direct action
by upholding the insurer's above contention, and reasoned
110
that if the direct action would be allowed, "the shipowner
may be deprived of his right to indemnification against his
52 53
underwriters." The Court of Appeals held that the
Louisiana statute is not limited to one type of liability,
but extends to marine protection and indemnity insurance,
and in support of this statement said : "The statute is
remedial. It should be liberally construed to accomplish
its obvious purpose, which is to afford an injured person a
direct action against a compensated insurer who has assumed
54
ul
t
imate 1 i abi 1 i ty .
"
It is clear from the above quoted passage that the Court
concerned itself only with public policy considerations and
ignored certain established and sound principles of
insurance law. The "ultimate liability" which the insurer
is said to have assumed certainly cannot be regarded as an
accurate statement, because the only liability which an
insurer under a marine liability policy assumes is that for
which the assured is held liable. It is understandable why,
but regretted that the Court did not address this point.
55
( i i ) In Olympic Towing Corp. v. Nebel Towing Co. the
Court relied in part on the Louisiana Direct Action statute
to affirm the District Court's award of judgement in excess
of the limitation value against the insurer of the vessel at
fault. The Court's argument was based on the grounds that
limitation of liability is a defense personal to the
56
shipowner, which cannot be availed of by the insurer
Ill
The Court did not directly address the issue of whether
P&I insurance, being contracts of indemnity, are open to
direct action in Louisiana. However, the Court stated that
the direct action statute becomes part of eyery insurance
policy having effect in Louisiana as though written into the
policy, and went on to say that "it is the public policy of
Louisiana which proclaims that liability insurance,
including purported indemnity insurance
,
is issued primarily
for the protection of the public rather than the
57
insured." This statement in effect equals indemnity and
58
liability insurance for these purposes, again favoring
public policy considerations rather than conforming with
substantive law.
(iii) On 5 March 1986, the United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit, in Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Ingram
59
Industries specifically overruled the Nebel-case and
held that the Louisiana Direct Action statute does not
invalidate a P&I policy provision which limits the insurer's
maximum liability to the owner-as sured ' s judicially declared
60
liability under the Limitation of Liability Act.
In this case a water intake structure in the Mississippi
River was damaged by a tow in tow of a tug, and damages
amounted to more than $3,9 million. The District Court
granted the owner's prayer for limitation of liability under
the Limitation Act in the amount of $2,1 million, and held
the P&I insurer liable for the excess of $1,8 million.
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The Court of Appeals followed its reasoning in earlier cases
61
and affirmed.
62
It was the dissenting opinion by Justice Brown that
became the court's reasoning in the en banc reconsideration
63
by the Court of Appeals, namely that the insurer may
limit his exposure, by a term in the policy, to the assured
owner's limited liability; thereby not availing himself of
the statutory right of limitation afforded conclusively to
64
the limit contractually by agreement.
It was also upon this ground that the Court
distinguished the Nebel-case : "In sharp contrast to the
situation in Nebel Towing in which the P&I claimed only the
right to a statutory defense, [the insurer's] excess P&I
policy by Rule 8(i) has a policy term which limits its
liability to that of the owner's limited liability. This is
a pol i cy not a statutory defense. The P&I insurer is not
claiming the owner's statutory right to a shipowner's
limited liability, but merely the right to assert -"ts pol i cy
65
defense .
"
Although the Court did not address the indemnity/
liability issue directly, the effect of the holding,
nevertheless, restores the indemnity character of the P&I
policy by holding the insured liable only to the extent of
the owner's judicially declared liability.
Only time will tell whether the Zellerbach type of
contractual arrangement will remain valid, or whether it
will be forbidden by state legislation.
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4.2 Direct Action under New York Law
66
The New York Direct Action statute section 167(4)
read together with sections 112(2)(c) and 46(21) precludes
67
marine P&I insurance from direct actions.
At common law, New York courts distinguished between
indemnity and liability insurance by holding that an injured
third party could not sue the insurer on an indemnity policy
when a judgement against the insured remained
68
unsatisfied. This distinction continued to be relied
upon as basis to deny relief against insurers under direct
action statutes. In Cucurillo v. American SS Owners Mutual
69
P&I Association Inc .. the court held that P&I
underwriters were not directly liable to the judgement
creditor of a bankrupt assured, and followed its earlier
holding in Meridian Trading Corp. v. National Automobile and
70
Cas . Ins . Co
.
when it stated that the P&I policy in
dispute was not a liability policy, but rather an indemnity
pol i cy
.
It would seem that New York, in the interpretation of
its direct action statute, strictly adheres to the indemnity
71
nature of P&I policies. The result is the consistent
disposition of such matters by the courts, unlike its
counterpart in Louisiana which by judicial construction
interpret their direct action statute differently in pursuit
of public policy considerations rather than in preservance
of well established principles of insurance law.
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C. CONCLUSION
The above developments indicate that, in spite of the
reigning Supreme Court holding in Pushing
,
the conflict
between shipowner protection (under the Limitation Act), and
third party protection (through direct action statutes and
sympathetic court) are indeed irreconcilable. The result:
confusion and inconsistency which disturb sound principles
of law; but only temporarily, because the process of law
will ultimately reign supreme and restore the status quo .
That is why the Zel 1 erbach holding in the 5th Circuit
72
did not come as a surprise. However, third party
claimants again find themselves in the undesirable position
of having to depend only on the limitation fund in an action
73
to recover losses from a shipowner.
This discussion does not attempt to deny third party
claimants due protection under the law, or for that matter
suggest preference for shipowner protection. Instead, it
attempts to express disagreement with the methods
implemented by the Louisiana legislature and the courts,
prior to Zel
1
erbach , to provide third party claimants such
protection.
It is the symptom that must be cured, and not the
disease.
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73. The effect of Zel
1
erbach is basically a nullification
of the Direct Action Statute's remedy to recover in
excess of the shipowner's limited liability. The third
party claimants in the limitation fund, and in cases of
death and personal injury, a sum calculated at $420 per
registered ton of the vessel is made available in
addition to the basic limitation fund.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The maritime adventure has traditionally been one of
great risk due to the vulnerability of vessels to the perils
of the seas, war, piracy and other risks, many of which do
not exist today. Shipowners were protected against these
risks by marine insurance of the time as well as the
provisions of the Federal Limitation of Liability Act of
1851.
Today, more than a century later, shipowners are not
less exposed to the risks associated with the maritime
adventure in spite of the fact that vessels are built better
and equipped with more sophisticated navigation equipment,
because new factors emerged such as the increase in size and
value of vessels, the enactment of stringent legislation
imposing new liabilities on the shipowner with respect to
the protection of the environment, and more significant, the
increased protection provided by the courts and legislators
to ensure adequate compensation for death and personal
injury claimants.
Thus, instead of the shipowner's traditional fear for
storms at sea, piracy and war, he is now faced with the
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cumulative effect of an increase in potential liabilities
and the modern trend of astronomical judgement awards in
liability suits. This change has been brought about mainly
by public policy considerations arising from the unjust
results of a system that protects shipowners often at the
cost of others who are denied adequate compensation for
death or personal injury.
But, in spite of these developments, the shipowner's
position with respect to protection has not changed much:
the 1851 Act is still in force, placing a ceiling on his
maximum liability, and marine insurance, which today has a
wider scope and offers protection for just about any
conceivable risk, is still available to him at reasonable
cost.
This situation has provoked widespread criticism and
dissatisfaction which have been reflected in the reasoning
of sympathetic courts and the statutes of state legislators
who often had to ignore or circumvent certain established
principles of law in an attempt to achieve public policy
ideals - a truly undesirable state of affairs.
The need for a practical solution to these problems is
evident. Because limitation of liability is considered to
be the source of all the controversy, it has been suggested
by many that the Limitation Act be abolished, especially in
light of the fact that the original purpose of the Act has
been achieved. However, the practical difficulties
associated with an unilateral abolishment of such a law has
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been stated above as placing such a nation at a competitive
disadvantage with other maritime nations refraining from
taking similar action.
Ratification by the United States of the 1976 Convention
seems to be an appropriate starting point on the road tc
reform, but would still not give complete adherence to
modern day public policy requirements. It is suggested that
the United States, as a leader in the international maritime
community, should use its influence to call for a global
abolishment of all limitation of liability statutes, thereby
preventing the consequences of an unilateral abolishment.
It is submitted that such drastic action will not have
any negative effect other than a rise in the cost of
insurance, and since most ships are owned by corporations
today, such rise will merely represent an increase in
business costs. There is no justification why shipowners
should enjoy more protection than air or land carriers, who
are also exposed to high risks and similar liabilities.
The fact that liability insurance has not only become
very expensive, but is often not available at all, has
created the possibility that large shipping companies with
high exposure to liability might very well find themselves
unable to procure liability insurance. It is submitted that
such companies join the ranks of utilities and other high
risk undertakings and become self- insured in respect of
such portion of their risks for which insurance cannot be
procured in the marine insurance market.
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